

dynamics
conditioning a live art
of movement-fields

pervasive,
non-mediated life
and the uncapturable

Part 1. bearings on a practice

3

- experimental writing, conformity and the requirements of a format
- situated ethics and experimentation
- problems of intention and non-intention
- authority
- what kind of writing tactics successfully produce an unauthoritative textual medium?
- experimental writing changes what language and thinking becomes
- ethics again...a real-time ethics
- a sailor and a tack
- however, I try on the shoe: terms
non-verbal; non-mediated; movement-fields; interconnectedness

Part 2. non-verbal

13

- predication: a grammatical betrayal
- the 'what are you doing?' question
- the 'you doing' part of the question: representation, identity and 'you-being'
non representational operative processes: artificial intelligence and/or consciousness
univocity of Being
- the 'why' part of the question: interfacing with reason
sensibility before reason
consciousness (machinic or otherwise)
to change consciousness is to train changes in the bodies intensities and materiality
- phantasm and phantasmagoria...phantoms, phantom limbs and pain
reality without materiality ...the virtual
voices
viral speech
- the 'meaning-event'
- representation and the pornographic
- 'a language of space'
- textual medium and immersive environment
- meaning, sense and incorporeal event; mediation and mediated environment

Part 3. non-mediated life

28

- coherence space-time structures; and the non-time of trance
- conflation of the term(s) perception and consciousness
consciousness or self-consciousness; and mediation
- again 'non-mediated life'
the term 'non-mediated life'; and Ho's definition of life; direct and indirect effects
non-mediated life; consciousness; and the event of sense
directly becoming living organism
the imperceptible and experience; direct affects; body and brain consciousness
imperceptible relative to perceptible realms
distinction between mediated and non-mediated life
registration; coherence
non-mediated life as the non-extrapolatable 'incorporeal event' of articulated meaning in languages
effects; indivisible body-environmental wave
non-collapsing macro-wave; indivisible becoming; the uncapturable; and noumenon
live art of movement-fields; conditioning dynamics; and quantum coherence
infinite life process
- improvisation as process
intuition and/or ideas and multiplicities
- pervasive, non-mediated life and the uncapturable
- non-realised site-specific ideas - Gunpowder Park *this section has not yet been written*

End notes for part 1

38

End notes for part 2-3

42

Part 1. bearings on a practice

experimental writing, conformity and the requirements of a format

situated ethics and experimentation

problems of intention and non-intention

authority

what kind of writing tactics successfully produce an unauthoritative textual medium?

experimental writing changes what language and thinking becomes

ethics again...a real-time ethics

a sailor and a tack

however, I try on the shoe: terms

non-verbal; non-mediated; movement-fields; interconnectedness

Bearings on a practice

Experimental writing, conformity and the requirements of a format

A standard conference paper format can already be a straightjacket for a bandwidth of thought. A consideration of the problems of starting to write a paper, in order to find a non-standard approach that is attractive, may include pondering on the distinction between the act of writing and formulation of thought. In the case of this paper:

- Should the writing be about transcribing pre-formulated thought?
- Should the act of writing thought within its unfolding immediacy be considered valuable as a process to foreground or attempt to adhere to?
- Should a combination of processes be patched?
- In what sense can the process of writing be an improvisation: free, experimental and/or indeterminate?

The transcribing of pre-formulated thought is, and critically so, a subsequent version that may, or may not, resemble or activate a prior formulation with accuracy, in the same way as each time a memory is invoked it is, in fact, re-invoked – the point being that the recurring memory will not necessarily be an exactitude of the first.[1] (Ho) and [2] (Deleuze). It will repetitively have undergone differentiation through neural processes that mean its reiteration will have become entangled with affects of other memories neural processing.

For example: I look out the window and see a family on the green playing with a ball. I think that there is possibly a lack of imagination demonstrated by the choice of using a ball. I am now writing this and will write (or rather type in) the thought that I thought just a moment ago: 'Families show a lack of imagination in their choice of playing with a ball'. I now reread the sentence to double-check what I think it says (I rethink the sentence as I read). Now I think the sentence should say: 'Families often choose to play with a ball which could be interpreted in many ways but may not necessarily demonstrate a lack of imagination'. This statement could be included in a future paper (ie as a pre formulated transcribed thought) – possibly as a title. But, as I reread this title I think and can consent to a gist of the terms and then 'agree' or 'disagree' with the statement or concede that the gist I accept is only my biased interpretation of the 'statement' which is not in reality fully specified to agree or disagree with. For instance, I can reproblematised the terms to infinity, such as, in what sense 'families', 'often', 'choose' or 'play' etc. Each new defining statement, eg 'Often is three times a day' comprises terms that again can be reproblematised, eg 'in what sense 'three times'. I could never return to the question of whether I agree or disagree with the sentence's statement as a whole, as this remains actively unspecifiable. Yet by the trickery of language, and fallible, (ie, on the basis of 'my' gist), I could affirm consensually that a specific statement has in effect been communicated if I offer up an 'I agree' or 'No, I disagree...'.
The paradox of regress, or of indefinite proliferation [...] This regress testifies both to the great impotence of the speaker and to the highest power of language: my impotence to state the sense of what I say, to say at the same time something and its meaning; but also the infinite power of language to speak about words'. [3] Deleuze.

Situated ethics and experimentation

In writing a paper it is relevant to question the situated ethics that will be demonstrated by the choices arriving at the process adopted. For instance, in my art practice I explore experimental activities which use various improvisation techniques that are usually directed towards enabling an open system to operate, (ie, enabling indeterminacy). There are reasons (and values) for my attraction to adopting these techniques – most centrally because I have found this path (al-

though not the only one) can lead to actual discovery, or the a sense of discovery. (However, particular ideas also directly influence which experimentation's to undertake).

As an artist undertaking the 'writing of a paper', potentially, in relation to my practice, I could use the format whereby 'I' comment on and critique the processes and discoveries made through other actions comprising my arts practice. However, I feel suspicious of this approach as if that commentaries textual medium would be ultimately most illuminating as its own fabrication and in fact be utterly dislocated and disconnected from what it purported to comment upon – and as if reference to this, if eradicated, could allow a textual event central audibility. To experiment with the act of writing and to write new thought I have to concentrate on writing content that is born from the affects of operations with a 'textual medium'; to consider and utilise thinking affects and affects on thinking. Any specified conceptual content would involve employing the ideology of representation and this would merely be some sort of guise over another act that should be foremost and undisguised by other 'over' text, (ie, acting neither as a subtext nor a text representation).

Problems of intention and non-intention

One is probably familiar with the demands for aims and objectives to be clearly articulated in relation to research and art project proposals. The dusty 'art for arts sake' and variation of 'change for changes sake' reason may, or may not, suffice as a personal ethics, but as a position will mean that one can expect to be marginalised by mainstream funding and conventional institutions. What and where might the alternatives: 'writing for writings sake' or 'thought for thoughts sake' suggest or lead to? 'Text for texts sake', perhaps, reminds one of the textual as elementarily a matter of potentially producing differentiating dimensionalities.

In a conversation with Simon Thompson (Oct. 2005) about arts practice and what limitations might be imposed by continuing to adopt 'experimental' processes or working in the paradigm of the 'experimental' Thompson raised the issue of non-intentionality. At this time I was reading *Audio Culture* (edited by Christopher Cox and Daniel Warner) which includes several writings by John Cage about experimental processes and non-intention. [4] (Cage). [5] (Cox). 'Introduction to Themes and Variations' (pg221) by Cage begins:

'Nonintention (the acceptance of silence) leading to nature; renunciation of control; let sounds be sounds.'

The idea of 'leading to nature' connects with other ideas about outcomes of experimental work, such as, concerns with a sense of durational event and indeterminate qualities of phenomenon's appearing naturally. (It's also relevant to consider the not necessarily contrasting idea of 'leading to artifice'). It is questionable whether outcomes which are unforeseen or indeterminate do necessarily lead to discovery – although they may do – or provide a sense of discovery. 'Discovery' could thereby, perhaps, become a desired kind of outcome of the 'experimental' paradigm, eg even a hidden intended outcome after all. But discovery too can be excluded – then the processes of nonintention leading to nature (or artifice, if preferred) could, alternatively, focus attention elsewhere and even require the reproblematisation of ideas of nature/artifice.

A clue to the discoveries a process leading to nature/artifice may result in is indicated by considering Naturalism's rejection of a 'false infinite' and the physics of quantum coherence in relation to duration. Deleuze writes in 'The Simulacrum and Ancient Philosophy':

'Nature is opposed to myth. Describing the history of humanity Lucretius offers us a sort of law of compensation: man's unhappiness comes not from his customs, conventions, inventions, or industry, but from the side of myth which is mixed with them, and from the false infinite which it introduces into his feelings and his works. To the origins of language, the discovery of fire, and the first metals royalty, wealth, and property are added which are mythical in their principle; to the conventions of law and justice, the belief in gods; to the use of bronze and iron, the development of war; to the inventions of art and industry, luxury and frenzy. [...] To distinguish in men what amounts to myth and what amounts to Nature, and in Nature itself, to distinguish what is truly infinite from what is not - such is the practical and speculative object of Naturalism.[...] Active gods are the myth of religion, as destiny

Authority

What I note as I begin this 'paper' is a dubious pressure to adopt an authoritative position which contrasts greatly with the positions I direct my arts practice to. It occurs to me that the ethics I apply in my art practice should not be inapplicable in terms of validity to my writing (as a practice).

When I begin to write I am forced to address these problems, as they in fact prevent me from beginning the thinking and writing in an otherwise manner. Should I follow a standard structure? As an outsider to academia, I wonder if I should open Google, type in 'how to write a paper', in order to gather, explore and assess the guidance and examples I find. I suppose that I may find guidance – for instance, *a formal paper of say 3500 words should organise ideas in such a way that the paper comprises of the following sections* etc. [7] The idea of using this, or any standard prescribed format of organisation, as opposed to itinerancy, appears to me as a limit that conditions a bandwidth (standard) of outcomes. (The idea of a standard is not unproblematic, for example, it has connotations of a 'fixed' or unchanging quality. If deconstructed one might think that actually only nothing is 'standard' and probably not even that, ie relatively there are no standard formats for papers or the outcomes of accepted set formats. But going along with this gist would not aid this particular discussion so I've temporarily chosen to ignore this argument).

In my arts practice I recognise the architecture of the theatre or any site as a conditioner and deliberately seek out sites for qualities of architecture and environment that will enable a break from conventional standard conditioning factors. It appears to me that a standard academic structure for the 'conference paper' format may be a conditioning architecture to be wary of reproducing and hence one I should struggle against replicating if I am to transfer an ethics I apply in my live arts practice to a writing practice.

It is relevant to consider the distinctions between practising and processing. A practice will allow the freedom to change processes as needed..., ie there is another crucial and variable factor here. To process achieves outcomes by way of the chosen operations – the outcomes may or may not be indeterminate. To practice refers to acts that involve directed engagement – and a directness of engagement – in producing outcomes (albeit not necessarily products, but, and importantly as operative tools). Therefore it is necessary to consider the difference between writing practices and processes.

The problem of how to write this paper here and now I find to be one of deciding what process to adopt. Concerns about the validity of any chosen process arise along with the problem of 'value' itself. It occurs to me that the examination of possible values of the writing bring me to premeditating affects and acknowledging benefits of particular aims, objectives and intentions which then feel suspect – as if again acknowledging particular intentions set conditions for the writing and condition the formulation of thought it follows.

It is helpful, whilst considering these problems of pre-structured writing, to compare the contrasting techniques of so called 'automatic' writing processes in terms of the direct manipulation with a textual medium. Other contrasting approaches to this problem of structure or framework can be seen in writings which montage textual elements, for example, the difference between writing processes which involve writing fragments specifically directed to particular matters or issues and then collating or assembling these.

Compare this to a writing practice deploying a writing process that commits to fore-grounding a thought continuum experience and an attempt to transcribe it. This need not involve any attempt at commencing from some sort of Zen-like zero but can arise from an approach that acknowledges interest in enabling a live thought process to unfold, as if something of more direct interest

may become from that than an attempt at asserting faithfully a specific content, (ie, one already decided and premeditated). Could this process realise a non-dialectical content?

What kind of writing tactics successfully produce an unauthoritative textual medium?

Such processes will acknowledge a poetry in the process of text, but this does not need to mean the outcome will be generally recognised as within the genre category of 'poetry'. I have in mind here a less obvious shift – one that can be described, perhaps, as more schizophrenic in the realm the writing produces. Imagine a style of paper that stood up to analytical examination (as relevant) yet obstinately remained unauthoritative... that was undeniably operating a kind of poetry or fiction but was not positionable as replicating any specific genre of fiction or poetry.

How could this be achieved? What difference in approach may be called for? Which authors, or should one say 'writers' texts are illuminating to consider here?

I'll share with you that I love JF Lyotard's writing, which is rich in aspects I wish to focus upon in terms of how ideas can be embedded and unfold indirectly through the textual medium. I hesitate to say 'text' here as it is very much particular styles of syntax that I am noting but, also, just to say syntax needs further explanation. In Lyotard's writing a complex extended textual syntax can be found and described as durational, spatial and non-linear. Often to extract out any individual sentence or paragraph or even several pages is comparable, say, to only viewing a fragment of a painting with dimensionality lost, (ie whilst fragments can be illuminating it is just as possible that no indication of the whole painting is given). This could be argued to be the case for all texts but I wish to say that texts vary considerably in the degree to which they operate complex dimensions.

In the translator's preface, by Iain Hamilton Grant, of 'Libidinal Economy' (Lyotard) Grant draws attention to 'Lyotard's long sentences' and 'the role of style' in a text, and concludes that: 'Lyotard's sentences may be long, but they are intensive rather than extensive'.

The textual medium operates a multidimensionality.

The following quoted extract is the last paragraph from Lyotard's 'The dream-work does not think'. It gives some indication of the complexity Lyotard's writing exemplifies...

'Reverie, dream, phantasm are mixtures containing both viewing and reading matter. The dream-work is not a language; it is the effect on language of the force exerted by the figural (as image or as form). This force breaks the law. It hinders hearing but makes us see: that is the ambivalence of censorship. But this composite is primordial. It is found not only in the order of the dream, but in the order of the 'primal' phantasm itself: at once discourse and figure, a tongue lost in a hallucinatory scenography, the first violence.' [8] Lyotard

It is the non-linear aspect that I want to emphasise here in relation to writing process. (Both a reading of Lyotard's 'The dream-work does not think' (in the 'Lyotard Reader'); and 'Directions to servants' (in 'Postmodern fables') [9] may provide indicators to Lyotard's actual writing process although not specifically about this). In 'Clouds', in 'Peregrinations: Law, Form, Event', [10] Lyotard does write of 'Libidinal Economy' (see pg13-15) and draws attention to his attempt to 'perform [intensities] presentation in flesh and blood in the text' as opposed to presenting intensity on a theatrical stage:

'there was something outrageous with respect to Being in my attempt to equate it with the text. The scandal lay in the claim that writing holds the position, no matter how uncertain, of the law. Nothing other than parody could follow such a claim.' [10] Lyotard

The so-called 'consciousness' of live (active and dynamical) thought generation [11] (Neidich), [1] & [12a-b] (Ho – 'holographic memory') as a process is non-linear and so it is relevant to consider how a premeditated framework for producing a writing could block the conveyance of a complex non-linear thought realm (and perhaps with this block the transcribing of complex dimensionality in a textual medium). [9]

Firstly, imagine a spectrum formed from a range of sentences. One extreme is a sentence that reverberates with a thought space that it opens; and another is a sentence that appears utterly flattened to informative, authoritative near-closure.

Momentary asides:-

(Of course, alternatively one could question how with either sentences there is also the problem of the potency the reader produces from the text but here I am just concentrating on the problem from the 'writer' side of the equation-function).

(Language operates because it allows terms to be temporarily conflated and then in reverse to fractalise).

(Language allows new registrations to occur through processes of conflation, blurring distinctions, the violation of definition and changing emphasis extrapolating new expression).

Secondly, imagine two papers written in contrasting styles, like the sentences. The first operates by an opening – perhaps comparable to the violence of a slash. Think of the artist Lucio Fontana's work or the violation of an incision – think the dissection that 'Libidinal Economy' opens with. [13] (Lyotard)

In contrast, imagine the second paper's style functions as an exact laying out of an enclosure relying on representation – for examples think of the styles of conference papers prepared for the evidence-based-policy research sector that may strictly rely on standard empirical quantitative and qualitative analytical methodologies.

Distinctions can be made between the presuppositions involved in 'analytical' text as opposed to (or simultaneously) textual medium as intensive operator.

Inserted afterthought (6 feb 06): also, perhaps, there is an important ethical aspect to recognition of text as an intensive operator as opposed to a machining of statement. One could contrast the predisposition of analysis, directed towards an establishment, through the representation of statement, as, in one sense, founded on a falsifying ethics. In contrast, the writer of a textual medium that is alert to the degree of a statements certainty — (its framed closure as the assertion of a truth – as truth established for all time, ie the theology of truth as of a permanent nature)— as its undoing may be able to direct other manoeuvres, in order to address issues framed in dimensions that assert any apparency of 'truth' as situated, ie not a flat binary. [I don't achieve this approach in these writings as I am still predominantly writing here in a way that makes statement after statement – and, upon reflection, have decided that I, probably, need to approach the content that interests me through the tool of a literature as opposed to an analysis or analytics].

Alternatively, imagine an opening in the sense of making language reverberate with a liquidity as opposed to a solidification. There are risks that when the terms upheld in a language liquidify communication can landslide and chasms of confusion arise, however, the upholding of solidification of terms (a regime) is stultifying to more than efforts of expression, as just indicated in the insert above. The analogy of a net, mesh or lattice of terms and grammars enabled as a liquid crystalline state/phase of matter [14] (Ho) is useful. There is active movement in this system. An unchanging language – one without any play, or variation in bandwidth – is a dead technology that can impede an awakening to the generative powers of thought.

The 'opening' and 'closure' referred to should not be understood as specifying an inconclusive or conclusive style – the paper that operates as an opening could include drawn conclusions. I am interested in using 'opening' and 'closure' rather to describe writing that is able to articulate ideas with preciseness but in a way that alertly manoeuvres the vulnerability and fragility of the writer's thread (one of terms and grammar) – the writer as ever a web maker when articulating – and the texts enabling an uncapturing stickiness and elasticity – temporarily reaching between and opening dimensions.

One might suggest that this is not a relevant comparison – that of empirical research with a non-dialectical literature – as clearly the different approaches correspond to very different directions,

in terms of purpose. However, I would say that any purpose text is put to can be tripped up, ie is fallible, if the writer does not fully realise underlying limitations and possibilities of the textual medium with which they are carrying out operations. Hence, the relevance of the comparison of what might be described speculative and contextual philosophical writing practice with the writing practice of the evidence-based-policy research sector.

Experimental writing changes what language and thinking becomes

Whilst the process of writing appears linear – word after word etc – complex dimensionality is brought into play through affects, which may, or may not, be carried in a linear way. Not only do words reverberate together, re-coloring those after and before, the slow dimensionality of the unfolding text, sentence upon sentence, paragraph upon paragraph, implodes and pre-affect the resonance of the paragraphs that follow – even before written or before read.

(Even for the accomplished reader, the act of reading is also an active process of learning-reading (learning to read): one causing the ongoing involution of neural processing (its overwriting and entanglement) that will act on the conditioning reader as each new text is ingested – itself generating further feedback).

This implosivity may appear to relate more to poetic text but any texts which veil to-one-degree-or-another an attempt to flatten an expression convey a reduced level of comprehension that potentially corrupts what is most vital about processes of thinking, writing and reading: as active quantum organic-machinic technologies of enunciation. In 'The General Line' Lyotard reminds us: 'One writes because one does not know what one has to say'.

'If humanity does not preserve the inhuman region in which we can meet this or that which completely escapes the exercise of rights, we do not merit the rights we have been recognised. Why would we have freedom of expression if we had nothing to say but the already said? And how can we have any chance of finding how to say what we know not how to say if we do not listen at all to the silence of the other within? This silence is the exception to the reciprocity of rights, but it is its legitimation.' [15] Lyotard.

Distinctions become apparent between processes of writing governed by requirements, such as additional inscription to the global knowledge architecture through informative evidence delivery – and those which do not comply. Writing that is not concerned with 'forming' or 'deforming' the 'represented' is free to change language radically and, hence, what expression can become.

Reading a text can be akin to listening to music or sound – temporal and durational events unfold and intensify. Whereas informative writing may concentrate on the consistent and organised delivery of point after point by an additive process other writing processes may not be addressed to the production of communication of points. Writers can be suspicious of 'points' and the making of points. An experimental approach may involve creating a writing that did not prioritise making points but instead disruptions.

Ethics again... a real-time ethics

My dilemma is: what approach is ethical for me to take when I write; and how can non-standard formats and experimental approaches be adopted, if being experimental also sets its own bandwidth of activity and outcome, ie do 'standard' and 'experimental' become like binaries that do not, in fact, reflect the situation as other options can be created.

It is ethical to be concerned with the affects of producing writings. To take an ethical approach may mean it is necessary to be open to considering ideas of good or truth, that may directly, or indirectly, be instigated through the tool of the writing, but, and crucially, as 'situated' and often as contextual. This ethics celebrates the vitality of change. Ethically, terms, and also what they attempt to pinpoint, must be recognised as, and allowed to be, alive: this may translate into writing acts which bring about new granularity as by-products of a phylum of expression.[16] (Deleuze)

A sailor and a tack...

In my arts practice I have explored, through movement in performance, ideas that seek to disrupt the figure from conveying representation based ideology. Therefore, when I write it feels inadequate to write from a position that reinstates an authorial voice. Writing as an extension of my arts practice suggests other experimental approaches need to be taken. Writing can be made to frame and foreground a liquid crystal speech, as opposed to an authorial 'I': finding new ways of operating and operations of grammar are required.

Would the voice of this writing be acceptable if the writing was delivered at a conference alongside speakers adopting the standard paper and presentation format...? [Consider the different pathways: to follow a new path; or to make a new path, ie how those wishing to receive a particular observation may also have to enter participatively into another way of observing than the seated listening audience of a conference attendee].

Why write a paper about an art practice as opposed to about what is explored through that practice without reference to it? If, for the most part, it is misleading to represent an arts practice, directing the pursuits of writing elsewhere can be ethically more honest. I argue, it is relevant to explore with acts of writing directly. There can be writing about particular content but can there be writing for the sake of a new writing and thought? ...a writing for a violation or thought... for a self-violation?

It is as important to explore and experiment through the medium of writing but is it at times unethical to change from this approach to one of commentary, critique or explanation?[17] For me, at this stage in my research, a change to commentary, critique and explanation appears to elicit a duplicity with the ideology of representation when it is, in fact, the dominant tyranny of this ideology that my arts practice explores disrupting.

In this world wide web age, which has meant an exponential proliferation of textual medium available, it is appropriate to question the ethics of any writing activity process.

However, I try on the shoe:-

Terms

The following are terms I have used when describing recent live arts practice involving performance with Maria Llanderas. The terms relate, in parallel, to questions raised in this paper.

Non-verbal

The content of our performance work resides with non-verbal zones of intensity. It is possible through art to bring to awareness and consciousness meaning through affects whilst comprehension remains denied within a non-verbal zone, and as such, not understood nor represented but potentially offering a more direct affect and resonance of meaning although still refusing a translation into language.

Non-verbal intensity relates to a coupled [18] (Ho) body and brain consciousness of intercommunicating live feedback systems. Affects of perception and imperception, and body/brain consciousness alter intensities and thought processes in feedback loops.

The movement in our work may stem from abstraction or recognisable so-called 'human' gestures or actions, however, the work is not representational and does not proceed to depict characters or identities. This is an important philosophical aspect of our work which is not directed towards 'expressing ourselves', which would be to affirm subjective expressivity. In contrast, the reading of a figure in space can be significantly diminished and subverted through actions which effectively dissolve the figures movement into the surrounding movement fields.

Non-mediated

Our work involves performance movement that alters perception of a sense of everyday time and, potentially, activates and sustains consciousness within a duration at once both in proximity and remote to sense. Meditative live affects unfold and transpire from this durational movement for us and the audience.

The physiological movement of a relaxed breathing body, even at relative stillness, comprises a sea of active movement through the body: a cellular, muscular, skeletal and neural organism. This awareness is an important starting point for developing control of movement quality or propulsion where movement is being driven from sustaining or controlling changing rhythms of breathing. A pace of breathing reflected in a pace of movement also affects a state of consciousness: perception, as a production of consciousness, changes.

Movement fields

Environments provide diverse fields of movement. Space is acoustic and atmospheric, traversed by sound waves and temperature changes, as well as more obvious movement, that of people, creatures or plants. Even the mountains are not still but moving comparatively slowly. Our movement practice involves bringing our attention to the different fields of movement at a site as potential extensions or contrasts to movements we articulate. For instance, in a park, can one become, in order to create a particular poetry, as slow as the tree; so still that the passing crow stops to stare quizzically at you; or as fast as the cloud or aeroplane shadow passing over? These various fields and scales of movement can be viewed together as creating a complex unfolding field of movement – a symphony event from micro and macro scale movement.

Interconnectedness

The interconnection of quantum coherence is helpful for visualising the conditioning of environmental connection with body/brain biophysical consciousness. Dr Mae-Wan Ho explains, in 'The Rainbow and the Worm – The Physics of Organisms', that 'our consciousness is delocalised throughout the liquid crystalline continuum of the body (including the brain)' [18] and that 'Brain consciousness associated with the nervous system is embedded in body consciousness and is coupled to it'. (A liquid crystalline state 'is a state or phase of matter in between the solid and the liquid'[18]). The liquid crystalline organism, or living systems of liquid crystals, provide rapid sensitive responsive and intercommunicative processes at the cellular level. I create work involving the performing body affected by environmental conditions and understand biophysical processes reveal the body/brain consciousness at a cellular level as a much more permeable, inseparable and unbounded phenomenon than is still commonly conceived.

Our performance work does not involve the representation of a prescribed event but actualises a live unfolding event. Improvisation techniques, some of which involve devised systems of movement, are used to bring about random and chance events. In addition, through site-specific work, we respond to particular coincidental happenings occurring in vicinities in proximity or surroundings extending beyond distances visible but, for instance, audible. A performance duration coincides with a density of other contingent environmental events that began before, continue after or interrupt the performance duration. The effects of these on the work are considered integral to the potential becoming or unfolding of the durational work: and are considered part of the medium of the work.

Part 2. non-verbal

predication: a grammatical betrayal

the 'what are you doing?' question

the 'you doing' part of the question: representation, identity and 'you-being'

non representational operative processes: artificial intelligence and/or consciousness
univocity of Being

the 'why' part of the question: interfacing with reason

sensibility before reason
consciousness (machinic or otherwise)
to change consciousness is to train changes in the bodies intensities and materiality

phantasm and phantasmagoria...phantoms, phantom limbs and pain

reality without materiality ...the virtual
voices
viral speech

the 'meaning-event'

representation and the pornographic

'a language of space'

textual medium and immersive environment

meaning, sense and incorporeal event; mediation and mediated environment

'verb. n. the part of speech which asserts or predicates something'. [L. verbum, word] [1]

'Where to begin in philosophy has always – rightly – been regarded as a very delicate problem, for beginning means eliminating all presuppositions' [2] Deleuze, in D&R chpt 3. The image of thought.

'Events make language possible. But making possible does not mean causing to begin. We always begin in the order of speech, but not in the order of language, in which everything must be given simultaneously and in a single blow. There is always someone who begins to speak. The one who begins to speak is the one who manifests; what one talks about is the denotatum; what one says are the significations. The event is not any of these things: it speaks no more than it is spoken of or said. Nevertheless, the event does belong to language, and haunts it so much that it does not exist outside of the propositions which express it. But the event is not the same as the proposition; what is expressed is not the same as the expression. It does not preexist it, but pre-inheres in it, thus giving it a foundation and a condition.' [3] Deleuze. LoS. pg184. Chpt Twenty-sixth series of language

'...Artaud pursues in all this the terrible revelation of a thought without image, and the conquest of a new principle which does not allow itself to be represented. He knows that difficulty as such, along with its cortege of problems and questions, is not a de facto state of affairs but a de jure structure of thought; that there is an acephalism in thought just as there is an amnesia in memory, an aphasia in language and an agnosia in sensibility. He knows that thinking is not innate, but must be engendered in thought.' [4] Deleuze, in D&R chpt 3. The image of thought. pg147

'Holographic memory storage is orders of magnitude more efficient than any model that makes use of "representations" because holographic memory employs actual physical simulations of processes [...]. Marcer suggests that the brain stores experienced holographic spatio-temporal patterns and compares stored with new patterns directly, recognition and learning being reinforced in "adaptive resonance", thus also making for much faster processing.' [5] Ho, Mae-Wan

'It seems to me that two essential aims of the arts should be the subordination of form to speed, to the variation of speed, and the subordination of the subject to intensity or to affect, to the intense variation of affects.' [6] Deleuze. 'One Less Manifesto'. (Pg 249 in Mimesis, Masochism & Mime: Representation...).

non-verbal

predication: a grammatical betrayal

There is a betrayal in a grammatical insistence through the propositions reliance on predication: a treacherous kind of existence is established solely through a verbal assertion. To the question who is betrayed the answer is more one of 'what' not 'who': it is the vitality of 'becoming' that is betrayed, enchained by the predication that links this life to that of an identity. Consequently there is a need for the old and new languages with grammars that do not predicate: languages that operate by way of non-verbal embodiment – where intensity is affirmed without a capture of tense in a durational eventual expression – one without the subject/figure/character of 'expressor'. Artaud's idea of 'an aphasia in language' relates to his description of 'a physical and non-verbal idea of theatre'; and his raising of 'the question of the intellectual power of art': with the power to 'make us think'. [7]

the 'what are you doing?' question

Recently a viewer's response to viewing video documentation of my performance work was the disappointingly predictable 'what are you doing?' question (my installations provoke the 'what is it?' variant). The enquirer was asking of a 'you' 'doing there' which exposes a particular underlying insistence upon a system of representation as well as indirectly leading onto a 'why' question.

the 'you doing' part of the question: representation, identity and 'you-being'

My reply was that 'it is non-verbal'. This answer often receives resistance, as if it is inadequate and still unacceptable that there could be languages that convey meaning without a translation occurring and a capturing of knowledge. What is this intolerance about? Is it that the idea of the translation of knowledge as essentially a mythological practice (alongside its obvious tremendous functional and utilitarian power) is not palatable, and why? With afterthought, it is the performances unspeakable nature that is its potential. What occurs during the performance is uncapturable in a descriptive form of words but the performance is still provisionally a language, a mode of expression.

With my reply I was not drawing attention to this non-verbal aspect in order to point to a genre of representational mime, which the work does not inhabit, nor using this description because speech and text are not involved, as sometimes they are. The non-verbal quality of the performance work refers to the meaning it carries as a language through other forces, such as intensity. In fact, I consider that neither a textual medium need chiefly be concerned with the verbal as opposed to its non-verbal event affects.

In my performance practice through concentrating on activating a language of non-verbalised (inter-active as opposed to extra-active) durational zones – unexpressive, uncommunicative and uninformative – through a live art of movement-fields I want to explore and trigger passage through collapses of grammars of sense (grammatical and dialectical meaning); to defuse signification in order to make sense and nonsense rebound or reverberate anew: to explore a language of events.[3]

Non representational operative processes: artificial intelligence and/or consciousness

By refusing a phantasmatic language (of psychological representational narratives) it is perhaps possible to frame the real miraculous and astounding artifice of natural life and the operation of effect-entities rather than identities – involving processes not unrelated to the artificial life of Rodney Brooks intelligent robots (achieved without reliance on representation).

'The fundamental decomposition of the intelligent system is not into independent information processing units which must interface with each other via representations. Instead, the intelligent system is decomposed into independent and parallel activity producers which all interface directly to the world through perception and action,

rather than interface to each other particularly much. The notions of central and peripheral systems evaporate everything is both central and peripheral.' [8] Rodney Brooks.

One of the most interesting effects of living in the information age is how our understanding of learning and learning itself alters. Now that we have so much information available and consume, or are engulfed by it, increasingly, to what extent will this be at the expense of a reduction in our ability to display long-standing traits of learning? Brooks gives the example of a butterfly that has the ability to recognise a second sort of flower but only with the consequence of forgetting the first that it was able to distinguish. To what extent do humans also have thresholds over which the ability to process information, in ways that will produce the traits of learning, remains constant and results in reception of new information affecting a loss?

It is interesting to compare Ho on the active processes of the living system and its intercommunication with the 'everything is both central and peripheral' but still mechanistic approach that enables Brook's robots a consciousness of sorts: a deceptive sentience, responsiveness and memory. Comparison with Ho draws attention to the difference between utilisation and affects of energy within a system versus a machinic intelligence relying solely on mechanisms.[9] (Ho)

'Organisms are isothermal systems in which the predominant energy transductions are electric, electromagnetic and electro-mechanical.' [9] Ho, Mae-Wan.

'One of the hallmarks of the living system is that it is exquisitely sensitive to specific, weak signals. [...] coordinated action of all parts depends on rapid intercommunication throughout the system. The organism is a system of "excitable media" – excitable cells and tissues poised to respond specifically and disproportionately to weak signals, because the large amount of energy stored everywhere automatically amplifies weak signals, often into macroscopic actions. [...] Do take note of the radically anti-mechanistic nature of organisms.' [10] Ho, Mae-Wan.

The robots Brooks describes may only deceptively exhibit responsiveness and may not actually be achieving a consciousness with any comparative faculties of memory and sentience. The following questions arise:

- Should a mechanistic type of exhibition of responsiveness be considered as a deceptive consciousness or actually a consciousness?
- Are Brooks robotic machines simulating a low level of consciousness (through the operations of responsive mechanisms) quite different from real high level systems of consciousness of living organisms – comprising of dynamically active body consciousness with an active brain consciousness embedded in this that also actively operates body mechanisms? Or, are both the mechanical and complex systems of consciousness in fact both systems that bring about simulations of consciousness ie all consciousness being a kind of artificial intelligence?

'Univocity of Being'

Here, additionally, in relation to ideas of consciousness and ideas of any conscious Being it's helpful to introduce what Deleuze says about the 'univocity of Being'.

'The univocity of Being does not mean that there is one and the same Being; on the contrary, beings are multiple and different, they are always produced by a disjunctive synthesis, and they themselves are disjointed and divergent, membra disjuncta. The univocity of Being signifies that Being is Voice that it is said, and that it is said in one and the same 'sense' of everything about which it is said. That of which it is said is not at all the same, but Being is the same for everything about which it is said...' [11] Deleuze.

To understand what is meant by 'univocity of Being' I think of pervasive vocalities. The key to grasping the importance of this phrase is foregrounding 'that Being is Voice'. Voiced being discloses the event of 'disjunctive synthesis' – the immanence of vocality – a production that is emitted and instantly its alienation. [12] Also one could view the processes of Ho's 'brain and body consciousness' as providing the condition and conditioning for the vocalities beings. Foucault explains:

'For Deleuze the noncategorical univocity of being does not directly attach the multiple to a unity (the universal neutrality of being, or the expressive force of substance); it allows being to function as that which is repetitively expressed as difference.' [13] Foucault, M.

the 'why' part of the question: interfacing with reason

sensibility before reasons

It is unfortunate that there is such a demand for reasons for art, which can result in the bringing about of *reasonable* art. What is meant by this, and why is *reasonable* art so often the requisite for new art commissions? 'Reasonable' art is sensibly purposeful. But a sensible reason relies on what is sensible being established. This also relates to ideas of what is perceptible and imperceptible. It may not be possible to establish what is sensible, as what is sensible relies on dynamics of consciousness. It may be that one could only arrive at a reasonable art if one ignored this requirement and, instead, tampered with the conditioning of the sensible. In answer to, 'why this way of – in my case live art – practice?', will the answer: 'in order to change the potential of consciousness (machinic or otherwise)' suffice, ie to change the sensible?

consciousness (machinic or otherwise)

How is consciousness: machinic, (ie mechanistic); live, (a becoming of quantum coherence); or both, ie biophysical? Alternatively, one could ask both, 'how are affects attributed to consciousness?' and 'why are affects attributed as consciousness?'. Additionally one can ask: is consciousness not only live, as 'affects' – as delocalized quantum becoming – but because of an evolution or process of differentiation in symbiosis with techne: as an evolving biophysical technology?

In 'Techgnosis' Erik Davis gives a full account of 'the tension between consciousness and the machine' [14] including 'the escapist desire for vivid and entertaining trances, and a utilitarian desire to reorganise the self according to the productive and efficient logic of the machine' [as]'questionable trends that already dominate the information age'. [14] In the introduction Erik says (of his book) his 'primary concern remains the spiritual imagination and how it mutates in the face of changing technologies'. In the closing chapter the following is relevant to consider in relation to takes on consciousness and machinic.

'Instead, these tensions [between faith and skepticism] and conflicts become dynamic creative forces, calling us to face others with an openness that does not seek to control or assimilate them to whatever point of view we happen to hold. By replacing the need for a common ground with an acceptance and even celebration of our common groundlessness, the network path might creatively integrate these gaps and lacunae without always trying to fill them in.' [15] Davis, Eric. *Techgnosis. Chpt. The path is a network.*

The 'tension' between 'faith and skepticism' relates to the 'points of view' that stem from, first of all, faith in a conscious Being, (ie one of 'common ground'), as opposed to becomings (of the condition of a 'common groundlessness'), so that, even before faith in god or self, the hood-winked position of conscious-Being or intelligent-Being is premised. The vision of an active organic quantum machinic is thereby rejected, as if its groundlessness can only result in the actions of an automaton, instead of the non-mediated affects of the indeterminacy of active quantum coherence.

To change consciousness is to train changes in the bodies intensities and materiality

Through art it is possible to avoid a 'standard' and standardisation of communication – a becoming homogenous or machinic automatons. The arts often work through affects of intensities of media and materiality rather than operating complicitly with readymade language systems. Maybe it is to do with whether one values meaning as an open rather than closed system.

'[...]the machinic phylum is materiality, natural or artificial, and both simultaneously; it is matter in movement, in flux, in variation [...].' [16] Deleuze, G & Guattari, F

The 'machinic phylum', as material technology, also evolves, but, as a mechanical technology, it changes through relatively more cumbersome, controlled and closed processes. Compare a mechanical machine that is designed to lift a certain weight. In order for the machine to evolve into a machine that can lift more the machine needs to undergo a re-design and consequently be

adapted or built from scratch. Compare this with a person who works for a day lifting certain weights. After a period of weight training the person will be able to lift more. In this process, instead of a machine external to the person's body being adapted (prostheses), the weight-trainer's body is directly adapted through the affects of the training processes: the bodies live materiality is susceptible to entrainment and conditioning.

In contrast, consider the training exercises of meditation practices on conditioning and deconditioning patterns of thought, and bringing change in relation to how a sense of consciousness or not, or other affects, might be alternatively entrained.

Inserted afterthought (6 feb 2006): Really the issue is not just limited to meditation practices. All activities accompany and contribute to a conditioning of meditative affects, that can impact upon the material and spiritual technologies of the living organism and ecology of living organisms, all of which, also, actively provide conditioning that reinforces sensory so-called consciousness. Temporal limits can produce adaptive affects and reinforce a particular recognition of a temporality: the habitual oppressive and/or pleasurable activities of our daily ways of life contribute to an intimate technology subscribed to.

New technologies bring change before any following intensive usage periods of that technology: there is the prior impact of the new activities involved in the making of the new technology. Therefore, creating new technologies, techniques or practices, as opposed to innovation, is also to actively reconfigure the material technology of the living organism – not something that should necessarily be taken lightly: here there are significant dangers worthy of caution – and freedoms that should be treasured. Every generations technological right, whether involving lo-fi or hi-def techniques, to explore a becoming, potentially, leaves the next generation doubly affected, whether the outcome is deemed oppressive or desirable. For instance, oppressed – both altered, by what have been the conditioning, operative affects on ecologies (including epistemological) from the technological exploration, and by subjection to any macro architectural systems conferred by the prior technological installation; or, alternatively desirably, both by a differentiation deemed wondrous etc and by inheriting desirable macro architectural constellations.

It is still very necessary to consider the epochal generational results of a techne's impact periods (see above insert), even if these are incurred from an intense continuum of accelerative change, in contrast to the more punctuated revolutions in techne of the past. For instance, consider the speed of the widespread adoption of recent technologies: information and communication techs, nanotech, biotech, including gm, or mobile/wireless techs.

Digression: In relation to new technology, another consequence is the need for 'precautionary approaches' to be strictly adopted, rather than flagrantly ignored – including banning introduction of technologies, as appropriate. Regulatory precautionary principals are important in relation to both the potential real unknown and known foreseen risks, eg toxicity, contamination and various forms of environmental pollution, eg transgenic and electromagnetic. However, with technology now, which operates increasingly through pervasive means and can be adopted on a widespread scale significantly fast, it is crucial to reflect upon and weigh more on the potential impact of unknown risks. There is, at least, a significant double aspect, then, to considering what a prudent precautionary approach might require. In the past a new technology may have been permitted relatively safely at a stage when there were 'no known adverse affects to health', (a statement with very different implications from rigorous research findings that state with confidence that there are 'no adverse health affects'). Previously, the type of technology and the extended time period before its adoption became widespread mitigated against the implications of the risk taken. Nowadays this is not the case.

Now imagine a computer that one needs to compute faster – even unimaginably fast – and one that can, using quantum computing, which involves a different kind of data storage using quantum bits (qubits). Qubits can be in a 'superposition' which enables 'many computations to be performed simultaneously' giving 'rise to what is known as quantum parallelism'. [17] To what extent has the age of quantum computing already arrived? Will using quantum technology, more akin to the systems of the living organism, ie at the speed of intercommunication in the living

system or faster, enable the capability of computing generative processing associated with thought? To what extent will a computed, comparable or superior, thinking-consciousness, consciousness of thinking or alternative thought realm affects occur and become operative?

One can also ask whether quantum computing should even still be considered a process of computing, in the same way that the body's liquid crystal continuum provides a system for communication that is not the same kind of communication process as the nervous system.

A fascinating example of development in how perception and consciousness can be experienced and trained (in tandem with technology) is shown by an experiment involving learning to control brain waves 'scalp-recorded electroencephalogram rhythms'. Ho reports on 'electrode-studded "thinking caps" which enabled the wearers 'to control a computer with their thoughts [without] surgery or implant required'. [18]

'The key was a special adaptive algorithm - a computer programme - that successively optimised the translation of filtered brain signals into what the users wanted the computer to do. It took practice but all four [volunteers] learned to move a cursor on the screen in two dimensions, vertically and horizontally. The two disabled men were better at the task, possibly because they were more strongly motivated, or because they have a brain forced to be more adaptable to cope with the injuries that left them paralysed.' [18] Ho, Mae-Wan

This experiment also indicates that we, perhaps, shouldn't underestimate the uses our bodies already put brain waves to unawares, eg, perhaps, in communication or other realms, especially with affects pervading body and environment fields.

[Note: Lauren research Alvin Lucifer's sound works using brain waves – as could be relevant in relation here]

phantasm and phantasmagoria...phantoms, phantom limbs and pain

reality without materiality ...the virtual

A phantasm or a phantom, what's the difference? A phantasm is an apparition with connotations of the impostor or a doubling whilst a phantom is a spectre or holographic phenomenon that, even more, denotes a reality without materiality but of affects.

voices

Do phantoms speak or just appear to – after all, they are only phantoms? Am 'I' speaking to you now? Is there a 'who' reading who can be sure of a 'me' or that it's me speaking or if 'it' is – biometric passports aside? If the way perception (itself the production of affects) interfaces with body consciousness (affects) is – amongst other systems – through a kind of phantom body topology-map (phantom pain being possible from phantom limbs, and hence indicating that a body map corresponds to a whole phantom body, not just limbs [19] (J. Cole and S. Gallagher) one can arrive at the idea of a phantom speaker, thinker or thinking. Then, is it not relevant to consider further phantoms of thought? Potentially, a phantom topographic field could extend projected into ambient space.

The extent to which our consciousness relies on the alertness of a hypnotic consciousness or hypnotic affects, ie phantoms of thought, is perhaps indicated by listening to repetitive sound works utilising the repetition of words, such as John Lilly's experiments.[20] In one experiment the word 'cogitate' is repeated identically, and incessantly, and can be listened to for various extended durations, for instance 30 minutes or more, or much longer. The hypnotic effect on the listener gives rise to auditory hallucinations. This disorientation can start after as little as hearing 'cogitate' three times, which makes one question to what extent all or any of our recognition of auditory stimuli may rely on processes involving auditory hallucination.

Through this kind of experiment it is unsettling to find just how soon one realises one is disorientated and no longer can feel certain about the nature of the auditory material played, as distinguished from one's mind's reconfigurations. This leads one to an inversion of the idea of a trance state where, instead of being considered negatively, as a depletion of awareness, it enables a valuable perspective to follow on the nature of the general alertness accepted as a wakeful state: the fragility of its certainties are revealed as extremely susceptible to the operations of systems of registration, eg immersive time.

viral speech

A current corporate and media speech virus indicative of an identity malaise, insists on colleagues continually referring to one another directly by name. It is a power game. It is as if some leakage – something not quite watertight – is discerned and so the language order-regime requires constant reaffirmation that the individual has identity and is identifiable: 'Hello, Lauren. Hi there, Lauren. Lauren, can you do this? Thanks, Lauren. And how are you today – you are today – Lauren. Lauren Lauren Lauren: you will be Lauren all the time...don't forget who you are or that you are Lauren for ever and always, Lauren'. At work I am sent on a corporate 'Values' training day to coach me on articulating assertively this language of representation where incessant reference to someone by name is understood as showing respect for them. It appears as if all that is important is that respect is 'seen' to be shown – respect in actuality is a much more complex matter. In fact, I respect and cherish what is potentially not 'them' or 'me'. I need conversation to be disorderly: conversation as the delight and potential horror of a free improvisation always capable of an inordinate permutation, conversation of and beckoning the unknown quantity of confusion that creates vitality...always awaiting its new song and not afraid of its most precious multi-dimensionality. It is the capacity of speech to be indeterminate that is a most precious aspect of so-called freedom of speech. Recent political indicators, with regard to changes in legislation, give the impression that those interested in protecting freedom of speech cannot

afford to be complacent, for instance, ignoring issues relating to a lack of comprehension of how important the freedom is that is operative in the complex active processes of speech and thought.[21]

the 'meaning-event'

Deleuze makes the phantasmagoric come out of the shadows when he explains how the infinitive verb sparks the dimension of a 'meaning-event'. For instance, to walk, to run, to skip, to sit, to move, to think and to speak. All construe phantasms and a phantasmic event of meaning of a paradoxically ungraspable nature. [22 Foucault] [23 Deleuze]

'The Verb is the univocity of language, in the form of an undetermined infinitive, without person, without present, without any diversity of voice. It is poetry itself. As it expresses in language all events in one, the infinitive verb expresses the event of language – language being a unique event which merges now with that which renders it possible.' [23] Deleuze

Are the phantasms, of meaning, the simulacra of the identities of representation, just obligatory theological representations of a primary organisation of grammar: that of 'to be'? [23 Deleuze]. In contrast, Deleuze refers to the 'impassivity' of sense and its 'impersonal' nature [29-30]. It is as if the meanings that thought rains should have more than humbled us, and not lead us to claims of authority and origination, as there is no way of pinning a meaning (a nonexistent entity) down.[10 (see end notes for Part 1). Lyotard]

- How can phantasms be escaped, should they be and, then, how would a machinic consciousness figure?
- What is this strange kind of complex pendulum that swings from the sense of a meaningfulness to hollowness, and in contrast to teleological rationales that bring the actions of resentment?
- What kind of wisdom is it that those who survive on the edges of abjection surprise others by when they still embody a superhuman non-resentment?

representation and the pornographic

In pornography the representational systems relation to an obscene is revealed. If one makes a distinction between pornography involving inappropriate and unacceptable abuse, eg child abuse or other, and sets this pornography outside this discussion, one can focus on that which qualifies as pornography solely because of an otherwise pornographic nature. It can then be asked what is this pornographic nature and what is indicated by prevalent circulation of pornographic material.

Is it the breaking of a taboo and what taboo would that be? Pornographic depictions utilise pseudo stereotypical identities in a way that domesticates the real content as well as indicating that there is a link with systems of representation and desired escape from these intended. Pornographic depictions are not just of exposed bodies but of a pivotal exposure where Voiced Being is overcome, dissolved in the waves of sensation. The durations and events of ecstasy and eroticism reveal a nature that can be free from the identities of representation, in an obscene. Pornography is depiction of where the hold of the system of representation fails. It is this failure that is the target of the repression of the circulation of pornography and this indicates the scale of fear that surrounds the powers of intensities of sexual desire. As if to confirm this power, pornographic material can also exert sexual stimulation upon viewers.

One can compare the obscene of the pornographic with the obscene of the non-graphic counterpart, in the flesh: the physical erotic encounter of a sexual nature. Why should either engagement be any more taboo than the other? The affects of being in a sexual physical relationship are complex. There is an excitement which correlates with a lost being of a sudden wordlessness: a becoming voiceless. This becoming can be one that arouses a sense of revulsion, bestiality and fear alongside more passionate desire, acts of desire and feelings of release (both mental and physical).

This leads to a question of anonymity. There is, through sexual acts a shared intimate experience of anonymity – even anonymous becoming, ie potentially, where a traumatically intense situation of nonidentity occurs. The pornographic depicts this anonymity, although amidst other additional registers of content, and, hence, exposes the system of representational identity as the functioning of a theological regime and legislative law: a construct of a system of time – even an economy of time.

The obscene of eroticism is the escape from the domestic scene: a confrontation in which the phantasmagoric realm is undone and released – collapsing, spinning, reeling representation in vertigo.

But, what if the domestic scene is the provision of a certain kind of veneer and a more fuzzy anonymity simultaneously accompanies the intensity of life, whether comprising an erotic encounter or not. It is relevant to reflect on how processes of holographic memory function in relation to considering body-environments as pervaded by the affects of energy transductions.

'[...] the liquid crystalline continuum supporting the body field may also take part in memory storage, although this possibility has never been seriously considered. Laszlo goes even further to suggest that much of memory may be stored in an ambient, collective holographic memory field delocalized from the individual; and that memories are only accessed by the brain from the ambient field.' [5] Ho, Mae-Wan.

To what extent can, or do, these breakthroughs in the sciences bring, enable or trigger an aspect of collapse – like pornography – in the powerful hold that the theological paradigm of representation has on the encompassing of a non-subjective experience?

'A language of space'

'[...] A theater which, abandoning psychology, recounts the extraordinary, puts on the stage natural conflicts, natural and subtle forces, and which presents itself first of all as an exceptional force of redirection. A theater which produces trances [...] and which addresses itself to the organism [...].' [24] Artaud

'The domain of the theater is not psychological but plastic and physical. And the point is not whether the physical language of the theater is capable of arriving at the same psychological resolutions as the language of words, whether it can express feelings and passions as well as words; the point is whether there are not in the domain of thought and intelligence attitudes which words are incapable of capturing and which gestures, and everything that partakes of the language of space, express with greater precision than words.' [25] Artaud.

Artaud describes a 'physical and non-verbal idea of theatre', addressed to the organism [24] as opposed to the form of theatre that is concerned with the presentation of a text: and calls for theatre as a 'language of space'. [25]

What does a language of 'space' as opposed to 'words' suggest? A language of physicality and environment but also dimensionality. It follows to ask also what kind of space is word-space (not word count) as the textual medium is also complex dimensionally.

Artaud calls for a move away from a domain of theatre as psychological to one that is plastic and physical. [25] He suggests there are 'attitudes' that words are 'incapable of capturing'. I agree, but unlike Artaud, I would add that there are non-psychological forces, which are the affects of events of thought, that simultaneously are twinned to textual mediums and that equally these can operate as a 'language of space'. I do not refer just to the physical impact of the spoken word in terms of its sound vibration etc. I wish to make a distinction here between there being a psychological dimension the text creates (relying on representation or through narrative) and other non-psychological dimensions, non-verbal and physical dynamics that the textual medium can operate.

For instance, the syntax structure of a text unfolds a live meaning-event that remains non-verbal. This untranslatable meaning-event is a durational immediacy of energy – it may be violent, meditative or otherwise etc. Imagine listening to a performer for one hour whose performance comprised of no text other than any of the words which are numbers. Such an open system could be taken in many different directions by the performer, as they operated a textual medium, that could enable the representational aspect of the number-word to collapse in different experimental ways. Also, it is precisely (a sense of) what can't be captured that is most fascinating to show, whether through a meaning-event given in a language of words, movement or space.

How appropriate could it be, in the age of the quantum coherence theory which reframes understanding of time and space as (dynamically alive, non-linear and fractal), to still be calling for 'a theatre' as a language of space, or intensity, as opposed to calling for 'a field' or field-performance, as a language of multiplicity? Contemporary site-specific arts can experiment with both visual and auditory hallucinogenic (incorporeal) and directly physical dimensions by addressing the immersive experience of durational dynamical environmental fields.

Compare to Deleuze on where the arts could be directed:

'It seems to me that two essential aims of the arts should be the subordination of form to speed, to the variation of speed, and the subordination of the subject to intensity or to affect, to the intense variation of affects.' [6] Deleuze.

textual medium and immersive environment

Focus on the nature (active processes) of an immersive environment returns one to the meanings of 'media' and 'medium'. 'Medium', with the Latin root of '*medius*' [26] – middle – suggests the through-carriage or communication channels of positionable being or intensity and, hence, connotes: between, insides and outsides or centrality and decentrality (bandwidths and broadcasts). Instead, consider 'immersive' experience, or preferably just 'immersivity' without 'experience', as this again suggests the division of internal and external place. Significantly, 'immersivity' connotes processes that work by way of delocalisation through environmental systems. Imagine a pitch darkness, where no depth is visible, within which multiple projections of text appear and disappear durationally comprising an environment of a textual medium, perhaps a dreamlike immersivity.

A textual medium triggers a biophysical spatiotemporality (although a hallucinogenic writing of spatial and temporal perspectives) and, hence, can be considered immersive in more than one dimension. It is relevant to think of what is referred to under *mise-en-scene* (*mettre en scene* = to stage) also as delocative and immersive practices, rather than solely aids to producing the interpretative significance of a staged representational action.

'Instead of our interpreting the mise-en-scene of the unconscious, we should use these works to set up perspectives of realities with an eye on enjoying heretofore unexperienced intensities. The machines which are drawn into play are, essentially, no longer the machines of illusion and memory, but apparati for experimentation which permit us to quarter sensibility and draw it out beyond this old body.' [27] Lyotard

The following questions arise:

- How does immersivity relate to systems of embedded consciousness?
- Is a medium necessarily material or essentially immaterial?
- What different potentials are there from media processes that attempt to record or capture as opposed to those that are alive through active immersive processes?
- In what sense can an immersive medium be textual and non-verbal – eg, as a carrier, a transmitter – viral: the message only as symptomatic of infection?
- How is the temporal architecture or ecological environmental (energy-field) space the interactive medium of any situation or non-situation (immersive environment)?
- What is the significance of conceiving of environments of organisms as live; and of organisms as environmental systems?

Consider a reader's or thinker's stupor and intellectual absorption. These immersive states allow an aspect associated with playfulness to open up and disrupt the truth and error surfaces of analytics, potentially, leading to an exposure unlocking thought processes from the rigidity of categorical systems:-

'The philosopher must be sufficiently perverse to play the game of truth and error badly: this perversity, which operates in paradoxes, allows him to escape the grasp of categories. But aside from this, he must be sufficiently "ill-humored" to persist in his confrontation with stupidity, to remain motionless to the point of stupefaction in order to approach it successfully and mime it, to let it slowly grow within himself (this is probably what we politely refer to as being absorbed in one's thoughts), and to await, in the always unpredictable conclusion to this elaborate preparation, the shock of difference. Once paradoxes have upset the table of representation, catatonia operates with the theatre of thought.' [28] Foucault.

There are as many engines of literatures, probably, as there are people on the planet, some of which are concerned with how depiction can be realised, but also others that are concerned with acting as an operative tool contributing to the intensity of an immersivity. A process of depiction may tally with the insistence that is an order of grammar, whilst an intensive operation might be directed towards the activity of delocative energies of thought. It is still assertive – predicating representation – grammatically to write a phrase without a verb, eg 'The reader's or thinker's stupor, intellectuality and absorption'. Consider how a text functions if verbs are removed – the hallucinated perception of meaning still occurs. Phrases of nouns still enforce that a Being is

implied: what is 'the' or 'a' which is already dealt with Being? Perhaps, to instill as foreground the textual medium, or immersivity, one would need to write only with adjectives and onomatopoeically, eg red round over and fine and fizzy. But Deleuze shows that even this does not escape the univocity of Being as, first, eg for red, to convey meaning there must be the grammar and 'meaning-event' of 'to redden': the 'incorporeal event' of sense.[29-30 Deleuze]

meaning, sense and incorporeal event; mediation and mediated environment

By applying the description of 'non-verbal' to my performance work I wanted to draw attention to the aspect of how apparent meaningfulness is generated. In particular, the generation of meaning as a live effect not necessarily translatable into verbal interpretation (as description) – the intention of the performance work is not the signification of meaning or conveyance of conceptual understanding but an event of meaning. In fact, the unpredictableness or impassive nature of a sense event that the live work interacts with is the attraction to exploring the territory of live performance. In my performance work dimensions are realised by way of a movement-language – rather than actual speech – and aimed at foregrounding the immediacy of sense: as a live flow of sense and nonsense. As a movement artist it is as if one might move aloud just as one might think aloud as a writer listening to effects of consciousness: and make visible a live flow of intangible, 'incorporeal events'. [29-30 Deleuze]

'Mixtures in general determine the quantitative and qualitative states of affairs [...] But what we mean by "to grow," "to diminish," "to become red," "to become green," "to cut," and "to be cut," etc., is something entirely different. These are no longer states of affairs – mixtures deep inside bodies – but incorporeal events at the surface which are the results of these mixtures.' [29] Deleuze

'[...] sense is the effect of corporeal causes and their mixtures [...] It escapes and affirms its irreducibility only to the extent that the causal relation comprises the heterogeneity of cause and effect [...].' [30] Deleuze

Foucault's summary is of assistance here, with regard to the event of meaning.

'To summarize: at the limit of dense bodies, an event is incorporeal (a metaphysical surface); on the surface of words and things, an incorporeal event is the meaning of a proposition (its logical dimension); in the thread of discourse, an incorporeal meaning-event is fastened to the verb (the infinitive point of the present).' [22] Foucault

Questions:

- What is the difference between the metaphysical and the 'incorporeal sense' or 'incorporeal event' that Deleuze explains – how are these related?
- Does the idea of 'double causality' (that Deleuze explains) – that sense 'is the effect of corporeal causes' and 'a quasi-cause which is itself incorporeal' correspond to Ho's explanation of systems of brain consciousness as embedded in and coupled to systems of body consciousness, ie with feedback taking place in both directions?

A comparison between 'pornographic' and 'analytical' text, (which could be contrasted as intensive and descriptive, respectively), can show that the textual medium is not without corporeal affect: that the 'incorporeal event' [22, 23] feeds back within the environmental organism. The energy-wave [5] of life, of becoming, is affected by the thought-waves arising from the textual medium.

'If quantum coherence is characteristic of the organism as conscious being, as I have argued here, then the conscious being will possess something like a macroscopic wave-function. This wave function is ever evolving, entangling its environment, transforming and creating itself anew.' [5] Ho, Mae-Wan

The following questions are pertinent to considering aspects of mediation and mediated environments, ie when mediation occurs and between what; how visual, auditory or neural apparatus interfere with hallucinogenic mediation; and how the 'becoming' of thought corresponds to and disrupts mediated environment.

- In relation to meaning as incorporeal event, is any mediation necessarily involved; and, if so, mediation between what?
- Without vision how would hallucination and hypnosis change?
- Do I hear differently, without words?
- How does thinking differentiate without the grammar of meaning-events?

Artaud reminds us of an affect of emptiness and fullness of thought that natural environmental experiences can give rise to.

'Every true feeling is in reality untranslatable. To express it is to betray it. But to translate it is to conceal it. True expression hides what it manifests. It confronts the mind with the real emptiness of nature by creating as a reaction a kind of fullness in thought. Or, if you prefer, to counter the manifestation-illusion of nature, it creates an emptiness in the thought.' [31] Artaud

It is relevant to note how the Latin root of meditate is 'mederi, to heal'; and also that the Latin root of 'to heal' is 'whole'. Ho contrasts classical mechanical ideas of the anatomical body, including its heart as centered and the central nervous system, with the 'coherence' of quantum mechanical biophysics, of the cellular body as

'liquid crystalline continuum [...] responsible for the direct current (DC) electrodynamical field, permeating the entire body of animals' [and of] 'living systems [that] have a special kind of coherence or wholeness, which is characteristic of macroscopic quantum systems' [5 and 33] (Ho).

The following questions are relevant to questions of mediation and perception:

- Is not meditative contemplation essentially a hallucinogenic mediation?
- Is a mediated environment one that is transmitting and/or acting, eg transducing ?
- If an affect is the result of a transduction (through coherence) is it no longer a direct response to stimuli?
- If our perceptions are the result of the bodies and brains mediation of consciousness – the body/ brain media acting as processors when perceptions are built – how is the figure of speech (the person-consciousness who speaks) deluded, or not, in any personal claim to powers of perception or consciousness?
- Is it possible to make a distinction between communication, affects and/or perceptions that occur through processes of 'transmission' or 'transduction' ie a transduction process converts its energy producing a signal in a new dimension whilst transmission sends a received signal onward?

It is relevant to compare the process of transduction (transfer of power from one system to another in the same or different form) with transformation (the change of form). A transduction that results in power, in a different form, in another system has carried out a mediation from an initial, direct non-mediated power source system.

Part 3. non-mediated life

- coherence space-time structures; and the non-time of trance
- conflation of the term(s) perception and consciousness
 - consciousness or self-consciousness; and mediation
- again 'non-mediated life'
 - the term 'non-mediated life'; and Ho's definition of life; direct and indirect effects
 - non-mediated life; consciousness; and the event of sense
 - directly becoming living organism
 - the imperceptible and experience; direct affects; body and brain consciousness
 - imperceptible relative to perceptible realms
 - distinction between mediated and non-mediated life
 - registration; coherence
 - non-mediated life as the non-extrapolatable 'incorporeal event' of articulated meaning in languages
 - effects; indivisible body-environmental wave
 - non-collapsing macro-wave; indivisible becoming; the uncapturable; and noumenon
 - live art of movement-fields; conditioning dynamics; and quantum coherence
 - infinite life process
- improvisation as process
 - intuition and/or ideas and multiplicities
- pervasive, non-mediated life and the uncapturable
- non-realised site-specific ideas - Gunpowder Park *this section has not yet been written*

'There is no doubt that a body consciousness exists prior to the 'brain' consciousness associated with the nervous system. This body consciousness also has a memory.' [32] Ho, Mae-Wan

'Body consciousness possessing all the hallmarks of consciousness – sentience, intercommunication and memory – is distributed throughout the entire body. Brain consciousness associated with the nervous system is embedded in body consciousness and is coupled to it. [...]

Although brain and body consciousness are normally coupled to each other, they may decouple under certain circumstances. [...] Further evidence that brain and body consciousness are to some extent independent is Becker's observation that during a perceptive event, local changes in the DC field can be measured half a second before sensory signals arrive in the brain, suggesting that the activities in the brain is preconditioned by the local DC field. [...] It is reasonable to conclude that brain and body consciousness mutually inform and condition each other, and that the unity of our conscious experience depends on the complete coherence of brain and body.' [33] Ho, Mae-Wan

'I suggest that the instantaneous (nonlocal) coordination of body functions is mediated, not by the nervous system, but by the body consciousness inhering in the liquid crystalline continuum of the body. Implicit in this suggestion is the idea that living systems have a special kind of coherence or wholeness, which is characteristic of macroscopic quantum systems.' [33] Ho, Mae-Wan

'[...] a quantum system enters into quantum entanglement with the observer. So, how one chooses to observe the system determines what is being observed. [...] We must choose to use an observational basis that reveals the quantum mechanical properties, that preserves quantum coherence, in order to observe them.' [34] Ho, Mae-Wan

'viii. Computers, video, radio, printing presses, synthesizers, fax machines, tape recorders, photocopiers [...] Finally we realize we cannot `` reach out and touch someone who is not present in the flesh. These media may be useful to our art--but they must not possess us, nor must they stand between, mediate, or separate us from our animal/ animate selves. We want to control our media, not be Controlled by them. And we should like to remember a certain psychic martial art which stresses the realization that the body itself is the least mediated of all media.' [35] Bey, Hakim

non-mediated life

A body is an organism that is directly an immersive and interactive environment. One might think of the habitats of one's body just as one may the changing environment of a room. It's therefore interesting to review the extent its processes are local or delocalised, where there are: endings, beginnings or continuums; borders, limits, fringes, folds and edges; skins, surfaces or interfaces.

I am interested in using the term non-mediated to refer to the bodies systems and dimensions of intercommunication that do not translate into thought-perception effects but that are affecting and part of a complex (macroscopic) body reality – an immediacy that relies on coherence [33] and transduction but not necessarily the mediation of thought-intuition in an ongoing active conditioning of body consciousness. Biophysical aspects of immediacy that are outside the frames of the consciousness of thought-perception effects can therefore be viewed relatively as direct preconditioners of body consciousness which can become coupled and decoupled to the brain consciousness conditioning.

Questions:-

- What is the difference – is there any – between mediated and non-mediated environments?
- Are there any environments which are not mediated? Is all space or spatiotemporality in fact mediated space if all organisms are considered directly media, cellular media?
- How can an environment be mediated if 'I' already am media of that environment ie not a bounded separate entity?
- What, and is there, or is the extent of any difference between my hallucinated perception and my bodies non-mediated experience of an immersive environment?
- If a 'my' perception of experience is hallucinogenic how can 'I' be sure of what my body experiences in its immediacy (non-mediacy) ie if this experience is a non-mediated life (and non-verbal life)?
- How does a non-mediated affect correspond to the Deleuzian idea of the incorporeal?
- What is to be understood by the non-mediated ie what is it that is non-mediated? Is it time that is non-mediated and, if so, how could that be? Is it experience that is non-mediated? Is it live (active becoming) that is non-mediated?

coherence space-time structures; and the non-time of trance

Consciousness may be a matter of time effects being mediated but instantaneity or a sense of immediacy may not be revealing of a non-mediated effect but just of media capable of generating effects of time.

- How is consciousness a matter of generation of time immediacy or mediation?
- Why is it relevant in relation to conceiving of non-mediated life to understand how body processes rely on quantum mechanics involving coherence times and volumes?

'This representation of individuals as coherent space-time structures implies that space and time, in terms of separation and passage are generated, perhaps in proportion to the incoherence of action. [...] a coherent sage may well be living in a truly timeless-spaceless state, which is beyond our comprehension. I believe some of us get glimpses of that in a particularly inspired moment, or during an aesthetic or religious experience. [...] In ordinary perception [...] the organism interacts with the environment, a decohering perturbation propagates within the organism and is registered or assimilated in its physiology (in other words enfolded). This results in time generation.'
[36] Ho, Mae-Wan

conflation of the terms perception and consciousness

It is relevant to realise that both body consciousness, brain consciousness and affects of perception are often conflated and confused when the term perception is used or statements such as 'the body perceives...' or 'one perceives...' are made.

The theological consciousness that says 'I...' is the hallucination born from the affects of non-mediated dimensions themselves born of complex intercommunications.[33] The spectre perceiving 'I' is also engendered by a particular thought process (processing of thought).

- Is perception too a myth, (ie in relation to consciousness)?
- For instance, if we only appear to perceive when in fact we were affected and our responsiveness to stimuli just maps to the density of the body/brain intercommunication system then is consciousness a myth?

If consciousness is a myth, then, we are the living dead phantoms – and instead of perceptive are just like Rodney Brooks [6] artificially intelligent dumb creature-robots, ie able to give the appearance of responding with consciousness to stimuli whilst, in fact, our cellular machinic quantum system is just a supra sensitive complexification of distributed interfaces that poses a life.

- If our construing of our situation as conscious is not in fact the situation but that our machinic and isothermal functioning is so efficient we can pass off as if we are, then, what are the implications of this misconstruing?

We listen and talk to what we claim as 'ourselves' with our quantum coherent thought machines and we seldom wonder at this 'self' mirage – an affect of our situated pervaded extended embodied environment: as unbounded phenomenon and noumenon of ultra fast intercommunicating complex distributed live operating systems

There is also a conflation of the terms consciousness, being and becoming that needs to be disentangled. Through the effects of sensory perception one is not aware of all the responsive operations of our body consciousness (the alive body).

- The body comprises systems that make it a responsive body, but should one agree with Ho that, this then makes a 'body consciousness'? Is this a kind of domestication/psychologising of the body environment (living organism) which is perhaps only an actively responsive system although admittedly a supra complex quantum one?
- Should we distinguish between what we attribute with consciousness, such that bodies that are actively becoming and able to demonstrate responsiveness are not necessarily granted consciousness, as this implies a being that can step outside of itself?
- Should we be sure that consciousness is not a misconception of the predicament of a living system's ability to achieve responsiveness and communication, ie any semblance of consciousness is the result of hallucinatory effects?

consciousness or self-consciousness; and mediation

A process of mediation does not necessarily imply an outcome of consciousness as opposed to interactivity that can create the apparition of consciousness. The body's ability of achieving super sensitive responsiveness to particular stimuli, which may be amplified through cascading series of processes, and, via this mediation, of bringing affects to bear upon other coupled body-organ systems seems to be indicative of a complex interactivity. To refer to this as a body consciousness is perhaps not in some respects helpful as the sense of a 'self-consciousness' always seems to creep in too, somehow interlocked with the description 'conscious'. The term 'consciousness', in general, is perhaps indicative of an unnecessary and inaccurate psychologization of biophysical and quantum processes achieving a situated multiplicitous responsivity and indeterminacy.

Again 'non-mediated life'

- What can the term 'non-mediated life' mean and what am I referring to when I use the term 'non-mediated life'?
- What does the term non-mediated life distinguish between?
- Are the processes of life the processes of consciousness in itself, without a conscious-being, but of becomings of consciousness?
- Am I referring to a non-mediated consciousness or non-mediated events or becomings? Is it really non-mediated affects that I want to refer to as life?

the term 'non-mediated life'; and Ho's definition of life; direct and indirect effects

The term 'non-mediated life' involves an understanding of the evolving processes of life which leads to the question of what is being considered 'life'. Ho gives variously complex and straightforward definitions of life as

'a process and not a thing, nor a property of a material thing or structure' [37] Ho, Mae-Wan.

So, for 'non-mediated life' one could adopt the translation: directly active or interactive processes or the live conditioning affects these result in. The term non-mediated life, then, refers to: processes of becoming; the consciousness of becomings; and the apparent directness of effects. The directness or indirectness of effects relates to the results of the body/brain processing, mediating and preconditioning of systems that create perception. Additionally it's necessary to consider in what sense directness – for example, directness in terms of time simultaneities; spatial proximity of interactions or other dimensions of directness, eg effects of quantum coherence.

non-mediated life; consciousness; and the event of sense

'Non-mediated life' is useful as a term to distinguish between the effects of body consciousness and aspects of the embedded brain consciousness, such as the event of sense; sense of 'Being'; and duplicitous aspects of 'self-consciousness'. The body consciousness is achieved directly through life processes resulting in simultaneous continuums of 'becoming'. The brain consciousness, whilst embedded in the body consciousness, and hence preconditioned, also itself directly generates effects, such as sense events.

Therefore, one can say that there's a non-mediated life relating to brain consciousness, that more specifically relates to the 'incorporeal entities' of 'meaning-events'. But also, one can say that as processing of brain consciousness is preconditioned through the consciousness of body media, relatively the life processes of body consciousness are comparatively non-mediated to those of brain consciousness, but not necessarily to the effects of brain consciousness affirmed by 'incorporeal events'. Hence, body consciousness, whilst comprising of systems relying on processes of mediation to operate, overall also comprises the interactions of direct life: and hence, a non-mediated life.

directly becoming living organism

I am using the term 'non-mediated life' to refer to the directly becoming (macro) living organism, although the living organism is the result of active conditioning life processes. In contrast, body and brain perceptions and degrees of consciousness are produced through mediated and non-mediated effects.

the imperceptible and experience; direct affects ; body and brain consciousness

'One' (the figure that asserts 'I') cannot perceive the experience of what is outside of perception (the imperceptible) (and perhaps, in a sense, cannot actually perceive 'experience') but the brain consciousness processing that produces this 'I' is overcome (affected through a mediation utilising processes of quantum coherence) in the immediacy of any situation (pervasive ecological environment-events) by the affects of the imperceptible that the live body consciousness system creates when directly affected by stimuli. If (as Ho explains) brain consciousness is embedded in

and coupled to body consciousness, and both body and brain media can also at times be 'de-coupled' functioning relatively independently then at times the body or brain conditioning could be said to involve relatively non-mediated (direct) interactivity.

imperceptible relative to perceptible realms

The supra-sensitive body media intercommunicates but across its nested organic biophysical systems. Becomings produced (through transduction and amplification may produce an affect at another scale in another nested or coupled system but may not necessarily pass into the kind of affects that produce the perceptions processed by brain consciousness, eg the affects may be too fast or too slow or otherwise: hence a realm of imperceptible becomings can be understood to occur. (Also consider processes of registration and calibration, ie the aspects that enable different systems to intercommunicate). This active and affecting imperceptible realm could therefore be referred to relative to thought or sensory perceptible realms as non-mediated life – although, within the realm, the biophysical interactions are comprised of media of the systems of the organism.

The affects of this non-mediated life occurring change the 'macroscopic wave function' [5] (Ho) and hence produce simultaneously affects across the entire body and brain consciousness systems.

distinction between mediated and non-mediated life

There needs to be distinction between the biophysical body and brain mediation of the coupling processes of quantum coherence and the effects resulting in non-mediated life:

- the consequential complex and non-mediated live affects of the 'macroscopic wave function' that results;
- and, additionally the 'non-mediated incorporeal life' - dimensionality arising through the articulations of languages.

registration; coherence

Non-mediated life is the multiplicity of biophysical 'becomings': becoming(s) that are too fast, too slow or too 'other (whatever)' to be mediated into affects that brain consciousness registers or calibrates into subsequent sensory or thought-perceptions, although brain consciousness itself is, potentially, also preconditioned by these simultaneous biophysical becomings.

non-mediated life as the non-extrapolatable 'incorporeal event' of articulated meaning in languages

Non-mediated life may also be the inverse: the becomings of sense non-extrapolatable from the phantasm of thought, the 'incorporeal events' of the embedded brain consciousness that then feedback effects into the body consciousness. It is like visualising the additional possibility of independent events (as opposed to interdependent or mediated communication) occurring within coupled/embedded systems that may or may not be mediated across to the other system.

effects; indivisible body-environmental wave

This non-mediated life – direct life – is not of substance but of effects: occurring, aided by the effect of quantum coherence generating an active non-collapsing energy wave. This also means that it is affected by pervasive wave fields, comprised from the body's and the environments fields interacting in immediacy. And perhaps, even more: that the body and environment always resemble an indivisible wave field affecting a continuum of becoming. [Ho].

non-collapsing macro-wave; indivisible becoming; the uncapturable; and noumenon

The non-collapsing continuum of wave-field energy interactions creates a situation where the wave is always in a state of indivisible becoming: and, hence, a becoming that is uncapturable. A noumenal (unknown and unknowable) becoming.

live art of movement-fields; conditioning dynamics; and quantum coherence

This said, one can now make the connection between 'a live art of movement-fields' and 'conditioning dynamics': of quantum coherence. A live art of movement-fields recognises that energy change transformations are interactive and seeks to explore the potential becomings of situated (which are also immersive) environs through affects of movement energies, eg speeds and intensities.

infinite life process

Therefore, by non-mediated life I am referring to the energy and immediacy of an infinite life process (durational life 'in a succession without separation' [38] (Ho): experienced in itself as untimely.

improvisation as process

One can use improvisation as a process in movement performance, in either or combinations of the following ways or others:

- 'free improvisation' (although the term free is not unproblematic, *ie* to let oneself be led by intuition in the moment can in effect tend towards the production of a more rather than less determined (hence non-free) result as opposed to an indeterminate event);
- 'structured improvisation' or other 'experimental' system-device based improvisation approaches; or
- idea based improvisation systems.

Likewise the exercise of thought and writing thought can also employ improvisation process techniques. However, writing, then, may also be subject to the same dangers: namely, tendencies that can veer towards a stagnation producing a recognisable bandwidth of outcome, whether the inputs and influences change or not.

intuition and/or ideas and multiplicities

I have a distrust of some ways of improvisation: those which I would describe as solely relying on an intuitive approach. I am interested in methods which strive to recognise and exploit intuitive tendencies, and utilise particular ideas, through chosen apparatus, in the conditioning processes that evolve. I have explored movement and sound improvisation practice that has followed free and intuitive improvisation models; experimented with combining movement system devices with free improvisation techniques and, additionally, deliberately in relation to particular ideas. All three processes can produce exciting episodes of performance leading to a sense of discovery but it seems important to not remain at the mercy of any method or process, as it is important to be able to change the play in a particular responsive way, given an awareness or alertness to a contemporaneous situated need or desire.

I need to adopt a method only if it fulfils an overriding relevance to what is potentially of interest to be put at play. How art becomes can depend on how processes are open to play and worked with.

- How is this open play-work or work-play critical to any resulting immersive reality event; dimensionality and intensity of interaction?

My explorations with improvisation processes relate to my interest in movement-field events. Whilst free improvisation is a process used in many diverse and long-standing music traditions [39] (D. Bailey), the relatively recent 'Experimental' improvisation genre, [40] (Cage) through the device composition structures that engineer live indeterminate event conditions, is similarly interested (in an underlying way) in the power of movement energies (affects of complexity and quantum coherence). In 'Composition as Process: Indeterminacy' Cage analyses various particular works by Karlheinz Stockhausen, Morton Feldman, Earle Brown and Christian Wolff to draw attention to whether, or the extent to which, the 'composition' was 'indeterminate with respect to its performance'. [40]

In a sense, the experimentation of the 60's, is still unfolding but having explored processes for their indeterminate affects and discovered durational and dynamical movement energies these can now be brought into new play afresh through various differing approaches. These dimensions of energy-space (immersive reality) can now be tools with which to change the play and its work. Interests can shift from the focus being on conditioning for kick-starting an unknown event intensity to more directional conditioning approaches in order to:

- create an interplay with and of various conditioning immersive system environments, *ie* not for the sake of a new journey (for discovery) or non-intention (for event) but for an interplay of pervasive, non-mediated life and the uncapturable

pervasive, non-mediated life and the uncapturable

'ix. Therefore, as artists & cultural workers who have no intention of giving up activity in our chosen media, we nevertheless demand of ourselves an extreme awareness of immediacy, as well as the mastery of some direct means of implementing this awareness as play, immediately (at once) & immediately (without mediation).' [35] Bey, Hakim. *Radio Sermonettes*

Out of the terms 'pervasive', 'non-mediated life' and 'the uncapturable' the second upon reading still grumbles.

- In summary, what is meant by 'non-mediated life'?

What the term 'non-mediated life' draws attention to is the dimensions of life (formed by live processes) that are embedded to the degree that they are not mediated into the surface effects of conscious perceptions but still result in a conditioning sea of sensory and non-sensory affects.

Communication can be about producing an information surface and changing perception, ie transmission between communities. However, biophysical processes of intercommunication (transduction) are directly affect-producing: through the mediation of quantum coherence. Further questions:-

- To what extent is communication mythological and intercommunication contextually positioning?
- How does trance, hypnosis, holography and hallucination figure in the processes of intercommunication?

The condition (and conditioning) of perception is one of affects across many scales of active systems through quantum coherence, but conscious thought-perception may be likened comparatively to a holographic surface effect.

The sensory becoming of perception is also conditioning the creation of new art. To be open to a view of ones life condition as an uncapturable becoming entangled in and pervaded by the active forces of non-mediated life, may have a bearing on how ones art will become too. For instance, in contrast to artistic works that strive fruitlessly to capture a 'graspable' time or space, concerns may shift to arts that engage with the intangible live operation of durational affects. Techniques of play are relevant to interactions orientated towards such intangible, durational affects because play operates through a condition of immediacy and immersivity. In Hakim Bey's *Radio Sermonettes* the importance of the 'directness of play' is raised in a manifesto which includes the founding declaration of the 'movement Immediatism'. [35]

The directness of playing is similar to the immediacy with which thoughts are given to the writer to pen; and to the direct impetus the movement artist intuitively follows in an improvisation. But to play is also a process of playing differently otherwise it tends to revert to 'work'. Processes of play are integral in arts that use improvisation, however, rather than improvisation as an end-point 'method', even this way of playing can be permitted to become different by acknowledging that play, or improvisation, orientates in directions which can become changed.

non-realised site-specific ideas - Gunpowder Park

[this section has now been written as a separate work - See 'Field Foci' online at www.liveartgardeninitiative.org.uk]

End notes for Part 1: bearings on a practice

These end notes accompany my draft writings, during a working-draft stage. I have included quite lengthy extracts to assist me and readers with responses to these drafts. (The use of bold and underlining in the following in extracts is added by me, not the author.)

- [1] Ho, Mae-Wan. Quantum Coherence and Conscious Experience
Free article online at: <http://www.i-sis.org.uk/brainde.php>
- [2] Deleuze. LoS. P.265. Also see D&R p. xxi, 130, 241-242
D&R: Such a one is the Untimely, neither temporal nor eternal.
LoS: Thus, the eternal return is, in fact, the Same and the Similar, but only insofar as they are simulated, produced by the simulation, through the functioning of the simulacrum (will to power). It is in this sense that it reverses representation and destroys the icons. It does not presuppose the Same and the Similar; on the contrary, it constitutes the only Same—the Same of that which differs, and the only resemblance—the resemblance of the unmatched. It is the phantasm of all simulacra (the Being of all beings).
- [2] Deleuze. LoS. P.64, 166-7, 241. Also D&R, p144 and p.200.
D&R, p.144: 'With regard to memory, it is not similitude in the reminiscence but, on the contrary, the dissimilar in the pure form of time which constitutes the immemorial of a transcendent memory. Finally, it is an I fractured by this form of time which finds itself constrained to think that which can only be thought; not the Same, but that transcendent 'aleatory point', always Other by nature, in which all the essences are enveloped like so many differentials of thought, and which signifies the highest power of thought only by virtue of also designating the unthinkable or the inability to think at the empirical level. We recall Heidegger's profound texts showing that as long as thought continues to presuppose its own good nature and good will, in the form of a common sense, a ratio, a Cogitatio natura universalis, it will think nothing at all but remain a prisoner of opinion, frozen in an abstract possibility...: 'Man can think in the sense that he possesses the possibility to do so. This possibility alone, however, is no guarantee to us that we are capable of thinking.'11'
- [3] Deleuze. LoS. P.28
The paradox of regress, or of indefinite proliferation [...] This regress testifies both to the great impotence of the speaker and to the highest power of language: my impotence to state the sense of what I say, to say at the same time something and its meaning; but also the infinite power of language to speak about words
- [4] Cage, John. Composition as process: indeterminacy. (Published in Audio Culture. Ed. Christopher Cox and Daniel Warner. Continuum 2004.) pg 184
This is a lecture on composition which is indeterminate with respect to its performance. That composition is necessarily experimental. An experimental action is one the outcome of which is not foreseen. Being unforeseen, this action is not concerned with its excuse. Like the land, like the air, it needs none. A performance of a composition which is indeterminate of its performance is necessarily unique. It cannot be repeated. When performed a second time, the outcome is other than it was. Nothing therefore is accomplished by such a performance, since that performance cannot be grasped as an object in time. A recording of such a work has no more value than a postcard; it provides a knowledge of something that happened, whereas the action was a non-knowledge of something that had not yet happened.
- [5] Cox, Christopher. Audio Culture. Pg176.
In the late 1940's, John Cage [...] discovered Zen Buddhism, which profoundly influenced his aesthetic worldview. His Zen practice sparked a philosophical commitment to "nonintention," the affirmation of life as it is rather than the desire to improve upon it. [...]Cage developed a range of techniques that would allow him to relinquish control over his compositions and to place himself in the role of listener and discoverer rather than that of creator. [...]
- [6] Deleuze. LoS Pg278. The Simulacrum and Ancient Philosophy.
'Nature is opposed to myth. Describing the history of humanity Lucretius offers us a sort of law of compensation: man's unhappiness comes not from his customs, conventions, inventions, or industry, but from the side of myth which is mixed with them, and from the false infinite which it introduces into his feelings and his works. To the origins of language, the discovery of fire, and the first metals royalty, wealth, and property are added which are mythical in their principle; to the conventions of law and justice, the belief in gods; to the use of bronze and iron,

the development of war; to the inventions of art and industry, luxury and frenzy. [...] To distinguish in men what amounts to myth and what amounts to Nature, and in Nature itself, to distinguish what is truly infinite from what is not - such is the practical and speculative object of Naturalism.[...] Active gods are the myth of religion, as destiny is the myth of a false physics, and Being, the One and the Whole are the myth of a false philosophy totally impregnated by theology'.

- [7] PORT (Postgraduate online research training):

<http://www2.sas.ac.uk/igrs/port/writing.htm> (19 Dec 2005).

- [8] Lyotard, JF. 'The dream-work does not think'. The Lyotard Reader.

Ed. Andrew Benjamin. Blackwell. 1989. Pg. 50-51 (See pages 48-51).

'But this readability is a pseudo-readability. The readable signification of the dream, its immediate content, cannot be read: and even when it is, it ought not to be: Freud reiterates that we must not treat the content as text, but as an object. The reason is that even when the inscription means something (in Latin, but this is an exception, as we have seen: figure 2), its meaning is suspect, and can only delude the interpreter. It is necessary to disbelieve 'revons d'or' in order to grasp 'Revolution d'octobre'. We must reconstruct a primitive text, hidden under the gilded text, which the work has deconstructed, or if you prefer, we must deconstruct the edifice, the figure which the operations have constructed. Thus what is intelligible in the text is pseudo-intelligible: that part of the text which is preserved in every case is precisely the distinctive unit (phoneme, grapheme) which is non-signifying, and it is the signifying unity (the moneme) which in many cases is destroyed. What is most often lacking is the unity of discourse, because the Latin syntax is not respected; and, finally, in those very rare cases (Naevia) where the entire architecture of the linguistic units is respected, the very meaning which emanates from the ostensible discourse leads the mind astray. The closer we get to true language, the more vulnerable we become to the true lie. the figure cannot lie, since it has no pretensions to univocality. Intelligibility is therefore rather simulated, aped, than truly satisfied. That is why Freud speaks of 'misunderstanding'.

'Reverie, dream, phantasm are mixtures containing both viewing and reading matter. The dream-work is not a language; it is the effect on language of the force exerted by the figural (as image or as form). This force breaks the law. It hinders hearing but makes us see: that is the ambivalence of censorship. But this composite is primordial. It is found not only in the order of the dream, but in the order of the 'primal' phantasm itself: at once discourse and figure, a tongue lost in a hallucinatory scenography, the first violence'.

- [9] Lyotard, JF. Postmodern Fables. Chpt: Concealments: Directions to Servants.

Minnesota 1997 (First published 1993). (Also the foreword to 'The Lyotard Reader')

Pg152: 'The continual sublation of words is the modesty and probity of thought toward writing. It is an infinite endeavour, like translation. How that labor called 'correcting,' which is just as well uncorrecting from the point of view of the recognised and recognizable tongue, can be done, you have know idea. That you have to 'correct,' to throw away pages in the wastebasket, substitute one word for another one that is already written and that seemed to do well, that was pleasing, to disavow it, and thereby disauthorize yourself to authorise yourself by another word, perhaps more ordinary or more scholarly, flatter or more unexpected, the one who writes and rereads oneself in order to write 'better,' always, knows nothing and can know nothing about what the writer does in obeying that duty. What the writer knows is that you don't hear the thought if you don't listen to the words.' [...]

Pg162: 'Thus, you read while writing and reread what is written. In both cases, more or less, there is allography. Not yet written and already written, it makes little difference. I said: you cannot not listen to yourself write. Listening to oneself is to listen to the sound of the troop of words in disorder. You cannot hear a thought that comes along if you don't listen to this noise from which thought comes and to which it goes, out of which it emerges and where it tries to enter.

[...] the disorienting rout that (for him) perpetually takes the place of thought [...]

- [10] Lyotard, JF. Clouds. Peregrinations: Law, Form Event. 1988. Pg 5 and 12-15

pg 14: 'there was something outrageous with respect to Being in my attempt to equate it with the text. The scandal lay in the claim that writing holds the position, no matter how uncertain, of the law. Nothing other than parody could follow such a claim.'

pg 5: 'Thoughts are not the fruits of the earth. They are not registered by areas, except out of human commodity. Thoughts are clouds. The periphery of thoughts is as immeasurable as the fractal lines of Benoit Mandelbrot. Thoughts are pushed and pulled at variable speeds. They are deep, although core and skin are of the same grain. Thoughts never stop changing their location one with the other. When you feel like you have penetrated far into their intimacy in analyzing either their so-called structure or genealogy or even post-structure, its is actually too late

or too soon. One cloud casts its shadow on another, the shape of clouds varies with the angle from which they are approached.

[This last sentence reminds me of Ho on Quantum Coherence: the 'quantum system [which] enters into quantum entanglement with the observer. So, how one chooses to observe the system determines what is being observed']

- [11] Neidich, Warren. BLOW UP: Photography, Cinema and the Brain.
www.artbrain.org

Chpt. Avant garde cinema and the brain: [...] For the developing brain adapts to these new space-time relations [Neidich is referring to those of cinema and virtual reality] as neurons and neural networks within an existent variable population compete for this newly coded information. Those neurons and networks which most easily can adapt to these newly configured space-time continuum of the real/virtual interface will survive and undergo what JP Changeux has called 'exuberant growth'. Those neurons and networks whose electrochemical potentials are at odds with these new relations will undergo apoptosis or cell death. In the end the brain undergoes a kind of transformation or mutation in which a new kind of subject or observer is created. I refer to this newly sculpted brain as the 'cinematic brain' and the person who is the carrier of such a brain 'the Mutated Observer'.

Chpt. Ergonomics, mimicry and memory: [...] The fact that the brain has critical periods of development during which it has maximum flexibility or plasticity relegates the environments ability to change the brain to a specific time envelope to one generation at a time. Thus the changes its altered neurobiologic substrate can have on the environment are limited as well. Cognitive ergonomics is also important in shaping this generational flux. The changes wrought on the real/virtual interface one generation after another create a genealogy of such changes over time which are imbedded in the world and act as a foundation for further developments. Each field such as architecture, painting, fashion, and design create individual mutating memory systems that through their interactions with the other genealogies create cultural memory. Cognitive ergonomics unconsciously creates strategies that organize this information reducing 'information drag and friction' both synchronously and diachronously'.

- [12a] Ho, Mae-Wan. The Rainbow and the Worm.

See Chpt 15 pg 243. 'Organic Space-Time and Fractal Space-Time

- [12b] Ho, Mae-Wan. Quantum Coherence and Conscious experience.

Free article online at: <http://www.i-sis.org.uk/brainde.php>

- [13] Lyotard, JF. Libidinal Economy. Translated by Iain Hamilton Grant.

The Athlone Press. London 1993. I: 'The Great Ephemeral Skin'. Page 1-2

- [14] Ho, Mae-Wan. The Rainbow and the worm.

See Chpt 11. The Liquid Crystal Organism. Pg172

- [15] Lyotard, JF. Postmodern Fables. Chpt. The General Line. Pg 120-122

Now, all busy with legitimating exchanges in a community with others, we are inclined to neglect the duty we have to listen to that other and to annul the second existence it requires of us. And so to become ourselves perfectly interchangeable, without remainder, within the conditions of public and private law.

In what, thereupon, would we still be respectable? Rights and respect for rights are owed to us only because something in us exceeds every recognised right. The latter has only the final sense of safeguarding what is found beyond or below it. Misery, sin, unconsciousness, suffering, shame, or inspiration, energy, passion, grace, and talent, what do we know about it?

If humanity does not preserve the inhuman region in which we can meet this or that which completely escapes the exercise of rights, we do not merit the rights we have been recognised. Why would we have freedom of expression if we had nothing to say but the already said? And how can we have any chance of finding how to say what we know not how to say if we do not listen at all to the silence of the other within? This silence is the exception to the reciprocity of rights, but it is its legitimation. The absolute right of the 'second existence' must be well recognised, since it is that which gives the right to rights. But as it escapes rights, it must always be content with an amnesty.'

- [16] Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F. A Thousand Plateaus. Capitalism & Schizophrenia.

Pl. Athlone. 1992. See the definition of machinic phylum on page 409.

- [17] Lyotard, JF. Peregrinations, Law Form Event by Lyotard. Chpt. Gaps. Postscriptum.

'Postscriptum'

'Another word, an afterword, on the question of consensus. The disagreement I have with the German and Anglo-American philosophers about this point bears on how a community today could be considered to be vital. I think

End notes for Part 2 and Part 3

These end notes accompany my draft writings, during a working-draft stage. I have included quite lengthy extracts to assist me and readers with responses to these drafts. (The use of bold and underlining in the following in extracts is added by me, not the author.)

- [1] Chambers English Dictionary. 1989.

“verb. n. the part of speech which asserts or predicates something”.[L. verbum, word].

- [2] Deleuze, in D&R chp 3. The Image of thought, in relation to presupposition:

pg129. “Where to begin in philosophy has always – rightly – been regarded as a very delicate problem, for beginning means eliminating all presuppositions

- [3] Deleuze. The Logic of Sense. 1969. Pg184.

Chpt Twenty-sixth series of language. Also, see below [11].

*‘Events make language possible. But making possible does not mean causing to begin. We always begin in the order of speech, but not in the order of language, in which everything must be given simultaneously and in a single blow. There is always someone who begins to speak. The one who begins to speak is the one who manifests; what one talks about is the denotatum; what one says are the significations. **The event is not any of these things: it speaks no more than it is spoken of or said. Nevertheless, the event does belong to language, and haunts it so much that it does not exist outside of the propositions which express it.** But the event is not the same as the proposition; what is expressed is not the same as the expression. It does not preexist it, but pre-inheres in it, thus giving it a foundation and a condition.’*

- [4] Deleuze, in D&R chp 3. The Image of thought.

*pg147 ‘...Artaud pursues in all this the terrible revelation of a thought without image, and the conquest of a new principle which does not allow itself to be represented. He knows that difficulty as such, along with its cortege of problems and questions, is not a de facto state of affairs but a de jure structure of thought; that there is an acephalism in thought just as there is an amnesia in memory, an **aphasia in language** and an agnosia in sensibility. He knows that thinking is not innate, but must be engendered in thought.’*

- [5] Ho, Mae-Wan. Quantum Coherence and Conscious experience.

Free article online at: <http://www.i-sis.org.uk/brainde.php>

- [6] Deleuze. ‘One Less Manifesto’.

(Published in ‘Mimesis, Masochism & Mime: Representation...’). Pg 249

Also see Chpt 6-8 in Cinema 1: The Movement Image.

‘It seems to me that two essential aims of the arts should be the subordination of form to speed, to the variation of speed, and the subordination of the subject to intensity or to affect, to the intense variation of affects’.

- [7] Antonin Artaud. ‘For the theatre and its double’ (1931-1936). Pg 267

pg267 ‘The revelation of the Balinese Theater had been to provide us with a physical and non-verbal idea of theater in which theater is contained within the limits of everything that can happen on a stage independently of the written text, whereas theater as we conceive it in the West is closely related to the text and limited by it. In our Western theater the Word is everything and there is nothing outside of the Word. Theater is a branch of literature, a kind of high-sounding variety of language, and although we may admit that there is a difference between the text as performed on a stage and the text as we read it, although we may confine theater within the limits of what goes on between the lines, we cannot succeed in separating theater from the idea of a performed text.

*This idea of the supremacy of speech in the theater is so deeply rooted in us and we are so accustomed to regarding theater as the mere physical reflection of the text that everything in the theater that goes beyond the text, everything that is not contained within its limits and strictly conditioned by it, seems to us to come under the heading *mise en scene*, which is regarded as something inferior in comparison with the text.*

The subjugation of the theater to speech gives one reason to wonder whether by chance the theater might not possess a language of its own, whether it would be totally fantastic to regard it as an independent and autonomous art on a level with music, painting, dance, etc.

One finds in any case that if this language does exist, it is necessarily related to *mise en scene*, regarded:

1. As the visual and plastic materialisation of speech.
2. As the language of everything that can be said and signified on a stage independently of speech, everything that finds its expression in space, or everything that can be touched or taken apart by space.

Once we regard this language of *mise en scene* as the pure language of theater, we must discover whether it can achieve the same inner purpose as speech, whether mentally and theatrically it can lay claim to the same intellectual power as spoken language. In other words, we must ask ourselves not whether it can state thoughts clearly but whether it can make us think, whether it can lead the mind to assume profound attitudes which are effective from its own point of view.

In short to raise the question of the intellectual power of expression through objective forms, the intellectual power of language that uses only forms, or sounds, or gestures, is to raise the question of the intellectual power of art.'

- [8] Rodney Brooks. Intelligence without representation. 1987.
Extracts from section 8.2 How Complex? and 8.3 Is learning and such possible?

'**Artificial intelligence** research has floundered on the issue of representation. When intelligence is approached in an **incremental** manner, with strict reliance on interfacing to the real world through perception and action, reliance on representation disappears. In this paper we outline our approach to incrementally building complete intelligent Creatures. The fundamental decomposition of the intelligent system is not into independent information processing units which must interface with each other via representations. Instead, the intelligent system is decomposed into independent and **parallel** activity producers which all interface directly to the world through perception and action, rather than interface to each other particularly much. The notions of central and peripheral systems evaporate **everything is both central and peripheral**. Based on these principles we have built a very successful series of mobile robots which operate without supervision as Creatures in standard office environments.'

'The individual tasks need not to be coordinated by any central controller. Instead they can index off of the state of the world. for instance the grasp behaviour can cause the manipulator to grasp any object of the appropriate size seen by the hand sensors. The robot will not randomly grasp just any object however, **because it will only be when other layers or behaviors have noticed an object of roughly the right shape** on top of a table-like object that the grasping behavior will find itself in a position where its sensing of the world tells it to react. If, from above, the object no longer looks like a soda can, the grasp reflex will not happen and other lower-level behaviors will cause the robot to look elsewhere for new candidates.

8.3. Is learning and such possible?

Some insects demonstrate a simple type of learning that has been dubbed "learning by instinct"[7]. It is hypothesized that honey bees for example are pre-wired to learn how to distinguish certain classes of flowers, and to learn routes to and from a home hive and sources of nectar. Other insects, butterflies, have been shown to be able to learn to distinguish flowers, but in an information limited way[8]. **If they are forced to learn about a second sort of flower, they forget what they already knew about the first, in a manner that suggests the total amount of information which they know, remains constant.**'

- [9] Ho, Mae-Wan. The Rainbow and the Worm...
See page 215. Chp 13 Quantum Entanglement and Coherence
- [10] Ho, Mae-Wan. The Rainbow and the Worm.
See page 91, Chpt 6 Towards a Thermodynamics of Organised Complexity.
- [11] Deleuze. LoS. P.179.

'The **univocity of Being** does not mean that there is one and the same Being; on the contrary, beings are multiple and different, they are always produced by a disjunctive synthesis, and they themselves are disjointed and divergent, *membra disjuncta*. The univocity of Being signifies that Being is Voice that it is said, and that it is said in one and the same 'sense' of everything about which it is said. That of which it is said is not at all the same, but Being is the same for everything about which it is said...'

- [12] Deleuze & Guattari. A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism & Skizophrenia. Pg 266
- [13] Foucault, Michele. 'Theatrum Philosophicum'.
(Foucault on 'Difference and Repetition' and 'The Logic of Sense').
Published in 'Mimesis, Masochism, & Mime', edited by Timothy Murray. Pg 230.

'For Deleuze the noncategorical univocity of being does not directly attach the multiple to a unity (the universal neutrality of being, or the expressive force of substance); it allows being to function as that which is repetitively expressed as difference.'

- [14] Davis, Erik. 'Techgnosis'. Pg160 and Pg 154

'the tension between consciousness and the machine' (pg160)

'the escapist desire for vivid and entertaining trances, and a utilitarian desire to reorganise the self according to the productive and efficient logic of the machine' [as] 'questionable trends that already dominate the information age' (pg154)

- [15] Davis, Eric. Techgnosis. Chpt. The path is a network. Pg 334-5. Serpents' Tail. 1998.

The network path does not swerve from psychology, from natural and human history, from cognitive science, anthropology, or nanotechnology. Science and engineering are not enemies - how could they be? The disenchanting investigations of empirical and psychological phenomena, the canny co-creation of an evolving world, the death of (our conceptions about) God - all of these are stations, or rather nodes, of the path. The network path only blossoms when we accept that we will not transcend the sometimes agonizing disjunctions between our various structures of belief and practice. We will not simply sew up the conflicts between faith and skepticism, the stones and the stories, the incandescence of the absolute and the mundane absurdity of everyday life growing more bizarre and frightful by the minute. Instead, these tensions and conflicts become dynamic creative forces, calling us to face others with an openness that does not seek to control or assimilate them to whatever point of view we happen to hold. By replacing the need for a common ground with an acceptance and even celebration of our common groundlessness, the network path might creatively integrate these gaps and lacunae without always trying to fill them in. You can no more banish the noise on this network than you can banish the void from a cup - nor would you want to. You just attend to the chaos that comes until something unexpected blooms: a dilation in the mind, a dawning in the heart, and a shared breathing with beings so deep it reaches down to sinew. [37] Davis, Eric. Techgnosis. Chpt. The path is a network. Pg 334-5. Serpents' Tail. 1998.

- [16] Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F. A Thousand Plateaus. Capitalism & Schizophrenia. Pl. Atholone. 1992. See the definition of machinic phylum. Pg. 409.

We always get back to this definition: the machinic phylum is materiality, natural or artificial, and both simultaneously; it is matter in movement, in flux, in variation, matter as a conveyor of singularities and traits of expression. This has obvious consequences: namely, this matter-flow can only be followed. Doubtless, the operation that consists in following can be carried out in one place: an artisan who planes follows the wood, the fibers of the wood, without changing location. But this way of following is only one particular sequence in a more general process. For artisans are obliged to follow in another way as well, in other words, to go find the wood where it lies, and to find the wood with the right kind of fibers. Otherwise, they must have it brought to them: it is only because merchants take care of one segment of the journey in reverse that the artisans can avoid making the trip themselves. But artisans are complete only if they are also prospectors; and the organization that separates prospectors, merchants, and artisans already mutilates artisans in order to make 'workers' of them. We will therefore define the artisan as one who is determined in such a way as to follow a flow of matter, a machinic phylum. The artisan is the itinerant, the ambulant. To follow the flow of matter is to iterate, to ambulate. It is intuition in action.'

- [17] Dr John Vaccaro. 'The Quantum Computer' website. (20 Dec 2005)

<http://www.cit.gu.edu.au/~s55086/qucomp/>

*'As described above, a quantum **superposition state** allows a **qubit** to store 0 and 1 **simultaneously**. Two **qubits** can store all the 4 binary numbers 00, 01, 10 and 11 simultaneously. Three qubits stores the 8 binary numbers 000, 001, 010, 011, 100, 101, 110 and 111 simultaneously. The table below shows that 300 **qubits** can store more than 10^{90} numbers simultaneously. That's more than the number of atoms in the visible universe! [...] This shows the power of quantum computers: just 300 photons (or 300 ions etc.) can store more numbers than there are atoms in the universe, and calculations can be performed simultaneously on each of these numbers!'*

- [18] Mae-Wan Ho. Get ready for matrix. Science in Society. Issue 25, Spring 2005 Pg 43

- [19] Shaun Gallagher. Nailing the Lie: An Interview with Jonathan Cole

Volume 11, No. 2, February 2004 . Journal of Consciousness Studies.

The full article contains references to phantom limbs.

Below is an abstract from the JCS site.

In his first book, *Pride and the Daily Marathon* (1995), Jonathan Cole presented the neurology and the phenomenology of an extreme and unusual condition of deafferentation in his patient and friend, Ian Waterman. He showed how Ian, who has a profound difficulty with movement due to a lack of the senses of touch and proprioception below the neck, is nonetheless able to make his way in the world by sheer effort, will power and an ingenious collection of motor tricks. Cole's second book, *About Face* (1998), explored the personal and social difficulties faced by people who live with a variety of facial difficulties, including those involved in Möbius syndrome, autism, and blindness. In a book to be published in early 2004, *Still Lives*, he lays bare the experience of those who suffer from spinal cord injury, persons with paraplegia and tetraplegia, unable to move their bodies, but often quite able to move others, as they pass with varying degrees of success through their lives. These encounters with extraordinary people have put Cole in a unique position to glimpse the significance of those things that form part of our everyday and ordinary lives, but that we take for granted and hardly ever notice. The interview was conducted at the University of Chicago where Cole and several of his colleagues were engaged in a series of experiments with Ian Waterman.

[20] John Lilly (1915-2001). Neuroscientist who became a researcher of interspecies communication with dolphins although descriptions of his prior research employment activities engender ones worst nightmares of the heritage of neuroscience involving cruel and unnecessary animal research. Thankfully today the pressure to end abusive animal research practices continues and I hope will increase until the close is brought on this barbarism. As a student wanting to read about the latest scientific findings relating to consciousness it does require one to become aware of just what practices one might be condoning indirectly. It seems relevant to chose to learn from those contemporary scientists producing findings across these areas who are also carrying out an ethical ie non abusive research methods. This in itself requires one to consider and evaluate for oneself what qualifies as abusive research or not, and not accept naively standard institutional practices self categorised as ethical or non-abusive. Further information about John Lilly: www.johnlilly.com

[21] As of 2 February 2006 the Racial and Religious Hatred Bill was approved with amendments forced by the way MPs voted resulting in freedom of speech winning the day to some degree, although the closeness of the votes should, perhaps, cause alarm: votes against government motion – 283; votes in favour of government motion – 282. Source for quote and information: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/4668266.stm
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4666908.stm>
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/4112118.stm

'MPs voted either for or against government attempts to overturn a Lords amendment to the bill that said "abusive and insulting" behaviour should not be criminalised, merely "threatening" behaviour; and that people should not be prosecuted for "recklessly" stirring up religious hatred - that is, without intent.'

The Bill outlaws inciting religious hatred but without the amendment would have had serious implications limiting freedom of expression, particularly within the performing arts.

[22] Foucault, Michele. 'Theatrum Philosophicum'.
 (Foucault on 'Difference and Repetition' and 'The Logic of Sense').
 Published in 'Mimesis, Masochism, & Mime', edited by Timothy Murray. Pg 221.

*'[...] Death supplies the best example, being both the event of events and meaning in its purest state. Its domain is the anonymous flow of speech; it is that which we speak as always past or about to happen and yet it occurs at the extreme point of singularity. A **meaning-event** is as neutral as death: "not the end, but the unending; not a particular death, but any death; not true death, but as Kafka said, the snicker of its devastating error."¹³*

Finally, this meaning-event requires a grammar with a different form of organisation,¹⁴ since it cannot be situated in a proposition as an attribute (to be dead, to be alive, to be red) but is fastened to the verb (to die, to live, to redden) . The verb, conceived in this fashion, has two principle forms around which the others are distributed: the present tense, which posits an event, and the infinitive, which introduces meaning into language and allows it to circulate as the neutral element to which we refer in discourse. We should not seek the grammar of events in temporal reflections; nor should we seek the grammar of mean-

ing in the fictitious analyses of the type: to live = to be alive. **The grammar of the meaning-event revolves around two asymmetrical and insecure poles:** the infinitive mode and the present tense. The meaning-event is always both the displacement of the present and the eternal repetition of the infinitive. "To die" is never localized in the density of a given moment, but from its flux it infinitely divides the shortest moment. To die is even smaller than the moment it takes to think it, and yet dying is indefinitely repeated on either side of this width-less crack. The eternal present? Only on the condition we conceive the present as lacking plenitude and the eternal as locking unity: the (multiple) eternity of the (displaced) present.

To summarize: at the limit of dense bodies, an event is incorporeal (a metaphysical surface); on the surface of words and things, an incorporeal event is the meaning of a proposition (its logical dimension); in the thread of discourse, an incorporeal meaning-event is fastened to the verb (the infinitive point of the present).'

[23] Deleuze. The Logic of Sense. 1969. See [3 above].

pg 245 : The aggregate of surfaces constitutes the organisation which is called secondary, and which is defined by "verbal representation." **Verbal representation must be carefully distinguished from "object representation," because it concerns an incorporeal event and not a body, an action , a passion , or a quality of bodies.** Verbal representation is, as we have seen, the representation which enveloped an expression. It is made of what is expressed and what is expressing, and conforms itself to the twisting of the one into the other. It represents the event as expressed, brings it to exist in the elements of language, and, conversely, confers on these elements an expressive value and a function as "representatives" which they did not have by themselves. The whole order of language is the result of it, with its code of tertiary determinations founded in turn on "objectal" representations (denotation, manifestation, signification; individual, person, concept; world, self, and God).

[23] Deleuze. The Logic of Sense. 1969.

pg183 'Thus the entire organization of language presents three figures: the metaphysical or transcendental surface, the incorporeal abstract line, and the decentered point. These figures correspond to surface effects or events; at the surface, the line of sense immanent to the event; and on the line, the point of nonsense, surface nonsense, being co-present with sense.'

pg184 'For it is not true that the verb represents an action; it expresses an event [...]

Pg184. 'The verb has two poles: the present, which indicates its relation to a denotable state of affairs in view of a physical time characterised by succession; and the infinitive, which indicates its relation to sense or the event in view of the internal time which it envelops. The entire verb oscillates between the infinitive "mood", which represents the circle once unwound from the entire proposition, and the present "time", which , on the contrary, closes the circle over the denotatum of the proposition. Between the two, the verb curves its conjugation in conformity with the relations of denotation, manifestation, and signification – the aggregate of times, persons and modes. The pure infinitive is the Aion, the straight line, the empty form, and the distance; it permits no distinction of moments, but goes on being divided formally in the double and simultaneous direction of the past and the future. The infinitive does not implicate a time internal to language without expressing the sense or the event, that is to say, the set of problems raised by language. It connects the interiority of language to the exteriority of being. It inherits therefore the communication of events among themselves. As for univocity, it is transmitted from Being to language, from the exteriority of Being to the interiority of language. Equivocity is always the equivocity of nouns. **The Verb is the univocity of language, in the form of an undetermined infinitive, without person, without present, without any diversity of voice.** It is poetry itself. As it expresses in language all events in one, the infinitive verb expresses the event of language – language being a unique event which merges now with that which renders it possible.

[24] Antonin Artaud. 'For the theatre and its double' (1931-1936). Pg 259

'Therefore, I propose a theater in which violent physical images pound and hypnotise the sensibility of the spectator, who is caught in the theatre as if in a whirlwind of higher forces.

A theater which, abandoning psychology, recounts the extraordinary, puts on the stage natural conflicts, natural and subtle forces, and which presents itself first of all as an exceptional force of redirection. A theater which produces trances, as the dances of the Dervishes and the Isawas produce trances, and which addresses itself to the organism by precise means, and with the same means as the healing music of certain tribes [...].'

[25] Antonin Artaud. 'For the theatre and its double' (1931-1936). Pg 269

'The domain of the theater is not psychological but plastic and physical. And the point is not whether the physical language of the theater is capable of arriving at the same psychological resolutions as the language of words, whether it can express feelings and passions as well as words; the point is whether there are not in the domain of thought and intelligence attitudes which words are incapable of capturing and which gestures, and everything that partakes of the language of space, express with greater precision than words.'

[26] Definitions:

Chambers English Dictionary definitions:

landscape *n.* the appearance of that portion of land which the eye can view at once: the aspect of country, or a picture representing it: the painting of such pictures ... – landscape-gardening the art of laying out grounds so as to produce the effect of a picturesque landscape

language *n.* human speech: a variety of speech or body of words and idioms, esp. that of a nation: mode of expression: diction: any manner of expressing thought or feeling: an artificial system of signs and symbols, with rules for forming intelligible communications, for use in eg a computer – *v.t.* (arch) to express in language ...[*L. lingua, the tongue.*]

mediate *adj.* middle: intervening: indirect: related or acting through something intervening. –*v.i.* to interpose between parties as a friend of each: to act as intermediary: to intercede: to be or act as a medium: to hold a mediate position. –*v.t.* to bring about, end, promote, obtain, or communicate by friendly intervention, or by intercession, or through an intermediary: to be the medium or intermediary of: to transmit, convey, pass on. –mediacy mediate-ness... [*L. mediare, -atum, to be in the middle – L. medius.*]

meditate *v.i.* to consider thoughtfully (with on, upon): to engage in contemplation, esp. religious. – *v.t.* to consider deeply, reflect upon: to revolve in the mind: to intend. – *adj.* **meditated**. – *n.* **meditation** the act of meditating: deep thought: serious continuous contemplation, esp. on a religious or spiritual theme: a meditative discourse: a meditative treatment of a literary or musical theme. – *adj.* **meditative** – *adv.* meditatively – *n.* meditateness. – meditate the muse (*Latinism, after Milton*) to give one's mind a composing poetry. [*L. meditari, prob. cog. with L. mederi, to heal.*]

medium *n.* the middle place or degree: a middle course: a mean (*obs.*): (*in pl., mediums*) any intervening means, instrument, or agency: instrumentality: a substance through which any effect is transmitted: that through which communication is maintained: (*pl. media*) a channel (as newspapers, radio, television) through which information, etc. is transmitted to the public: (*pl. usu. media*) any material on which data is recorded: an enveloping substance or element in which a thing exists or lives: environment: a nutritive substance on which a culture (as of bacteria, tissue, etc.) may be fed: (*pl. mediums*) in spiritualism, the person through whom spirits are said to communicate with the material world: (*pl. mediums*) a person of supernormal sensibility...[*L. medium, neut. of medius, middle.*]

[30]

transducer: *n.* a device that transfers power from one system to another in the same or in different form. –*ns* transduction transfer, esp. transfer of genetic material from one bacterial cell to another by bacteriophage; transductor an arrangement of windings on a laminate core or cores, part of a device for amplifying current. [*L. transducere, -ductum, to lead across.*]

verb. *n.* the part of speech which asserts or predicates something". [*L. verbum, word*]

aphasia . *n.* inability to express thought in words, or inability to understand thought as expressed in the spoken or written words of others, by reason of some brain disease. [*Gr. phasis, speech – planai, to speak.*]

reverberate. *v.t.* to beat or send back; to reflect; to echo/re-echo/resound. [*L. reverberare, -atum – re-, back, verberare, to beat – verber, a lash.*]

Definitions from wikipedia

atom is a microscopic structure found in all ordinary matter around us. Atoms are composed of 3 types of subatomic particles: electrons, which have a negative charge; protons, which have a positive charge; and neutrons, which have no charge.

quantum, *pl.* "quanta", comes from the Latin "quantus", for "how much". In general, it refers to an "amount of something". But, the term is often used in the more specific sense which it has in physics, where a quantum refers to an indivisible, and perhaps elementary entity. For instance, a "light quantum", being a unit of light (that is, a photon). In combinations like "quantum mechanics", "quantum optics", etc., it distinguishes a more specialized field of study.

Quantum mechanics is a fundamental physical theory which extends and corrects Newtonian mechanics, especially at the atomic and subatomic levels. The term quantum (Latin for how much) refers to the discrete units that the theory assigns to certain physical quantities, such as the energy of an atom at rest (see Figure 1, at right).

Quantum mechanics is a theory of mechanics, a branch of physics that deals with the motion of bodies and associated physical quantities such as energy and momentum. Mechanics can be subdivided into classical mechanics, relativistic mechanics, non-relativistic quantum mechanics, and relativistic quantum mechanics (quantum field theory). Quantum mechanics is regarded as more "fundamental" than the first two theories of mechanics, because the predictions of quantum mechanics have never been disproven after a century's worth of experiments. We will use the term "quantum mechanics" to refer to both relativistic and non-relativistic quantum mechanics; the terms **quantum physics** and **quantum theory** are synonymous. It should be noted, however, that certain authors refer to "quantum mechanics" in the more restricted sense of non-relativistic quantum mechanics.

A **phonon** is a quantized **mode** of vibration occurring in a rigid crystal lattice, such as the atomic lattice of a solid. The study of phonons is an important part of solid state physics, because phonons play an important role in many of the physical properties of solids, such as the thermal conductivity and the electrical conductivity. In particular, the properties of long-wavelength phonons gives rise to sound in solids -- hence the name phonon. In insulating solids, phonons are also the primary mechanism by which heat conduction takes place.

Phonons are a quantum mechanical version of a special type of vibrational motion, known as normal modes in classical mechanics, in which each part of a lattice oscillates with the same frequency. These normal modes are important because, according to a well-known result in classical mechanics, any arbitrary vibrational motion of a lattice can be considered as a superposition of normal modes with various frequencies; in this sense, the normal modes are the elementary vibrations of the lattice. Although normal modes are wavelike phenomena in classical mechanics, they acquire certain particle-like properties when the lattice is analysed using quantum mechanics (see wave-particle duality.) They are then known as phonons. Phonons are bosons possessing zero spin.

Quantum Coherence: is a state of balance when two quanta's individual frequencies are in constructive interaction.

- [27] Lyotard, J.F. 'The Unconscious as Mise-en-Scene'. Pg 163
(Published in 'Mimesis, Masochism & Mime: Representation...').

'When the force used to stage something has no goal other than to make manifest potentiality, when it is the same force that produces and implements the most sophisticated programs and machines, the distinction between desire and the unconscious disappears entirely. By the same token, works must not be taken as symptoms symbolically expressing a concealed discourse, but as attempts to state perspectives of reality. Interpretation must in turn give way to description of devices. As for these descriptions, they are no less prescriptive in nature than works; they continue and eventually reroute the perspective-creating potentialities these works contain. Inversely, the time has come to consider the would-be symptoms as artistic creations.

Instead of our interpreting the mise-en-scene of the unconscious, we should use these works to set up perspectives of realities with an eye on enjoying heretofore unexperienced intensities. The machines which are drawn into play are, essentially, no longer the machines of illusion and memory, but apparati for experimentation which permit us to quarter sensibility and draw it out beyond this old body.'

- [28] Foucault, Michele. 'Theatrum Philosophicum'.
(Foucault on 'Difference and Repetition' and 'The Logic of Sense').
Published in 'Mimesis, Masochism, & Mime', edited by Timothy Murray. Pg 221.

*'Intelligence does not respond to stupidity, since it is stupidity already vanquished, the categorical art of avoiding error. The scholar is intelligent. But it is thought that confronts stupidity, and it is the philosopher who observes it. Their private conversation is a lengthy one, as the philosopher's sight plunges into this candleless skull. It is his death mask, his temptation, perhaps his desire, his catatonic theatre. **At the limit, thought would be the intense contemplation from close up --to the point of losing oneself in it-- of stupidity**; and its other side is formed by lassitude, immobility, excessive fatigue, obstinate muteness, and inertia --or rather, they form its accompaniment, the daily and thankless exercise which prepares it and which it suddenly dissipates. The philosopher must be sufficiently **perverse** to play the game of truth and error badly: this perversity, which operates in paradoxes, allows him to escape the grasp of categories. But aside from this, he must be sufficiently "ill-humored" to persist in his confrontation with stupidity, to remain motionless to the point of stupefaction in order to approach it successfully and mime it, to let it slowly grow within himself (this is probably what we politely refer to as being absorbed in one's thoughts), and to await, in the always unpredictable conclusion to this elaborate preparation, the shock of difference. Once paradoxes have upset the table of representation, catatonia operates with the theatre of thought.'*

- [29] Deleuze, G. LoS. 'Second series of Paradoxes of Surface Effects'. Pg 4-6.

*The Stoics also distinguish between two kinds of things. First, there are bodies with their tensions, physical qualities, actions and passions, and corresponding "states of affairs". These states of affairs, actions and passions, are determined by the mixtures of bodies. [...]Second, all bodies are causes in relation to each other, and causes for each other – but causes for what? They are causes of certain things of an entirely different nature. These 'effects' are not bodies, but, properly speaking "incorporeal" entities. They are not physical qualities and properties, but rather logical or dialectical attributes. They are not things or facts, but events. We cannot say that they exist, but rather that they subsist or inhere (having a minimum of being which is appropriate to that which is not a thing, a nonexistent entity). They are not substantives or adjectives but verbs. They are neither agents nor patients, but results of actions and passions. They are "impassive" entities – impassive results. They are not living presents but infinitives: the unlimited Aion, the becoming which divides itself infinitely in past and future and always eludes the present. [...] Mixtures are in bodies, and in the depth of bodies: a body penetrates another and coexists with it in all of its parts, like a drop of wine in the ocean, or fire in the iron. One body withdraws from another, like liquid from a vase. Mixtures in general determine the quantitative and qualitative states of affairs: the dimensions of an ensemble - the red of iron, the green of a tree. But what we mean by "to grow," "to diminish," "to become red," "to become green," "to cut," and "to be cut," etc., is something entirely different. These are no longer states of affairs – mixtures deep inside bodies – but **incorporeal events** at the surface which are the results of these mixtures. [34] Deleuze*

- [30] Deleuze, G. LoS. 'Double Causality'. Pg 94

[...] sense is the effect of corporeal causes and their mixtures [...] It escapes and affirms its irreducibility only to the extent that the causal relation comprises the heterogeneity of cause and effect [...]. [35] Deleuze

- [31] Antonin Artaud. 'For the theatre and its double' (1931-1936). Pg 269

*Artaud, pg 269 'Every true feeling is in reality **untranslatable. To express it is to betray it.** But to translate it is to conceal it. True expression hides what it manifests. It confronts the mind with the real emptiness of nature by creating as a reaction a kind of fullness in thought. Or, if you prefer, to counter the manifestation-illusion of nature, it creates an emptiness in the thought. Every powerful emotion awakens in us the idea of emptiness. And the **clear language** which prevents this sense of emptiness also prevents poetry from appearing in the mind. This is why an image, an allegory, a figure of speech which disguises what it wants to reveal has more meaning for the mind than the clarity provided by the analytical properties of speech.*

This is why true beauty never impresses us directly, and why a setting sun is beautiful because of everything it takes away from us.' [16] Artaud

- [32] Ho, Mae-Wan. The Rainbow and the Worm...
See page 191. Chp12 Crystal Consciousness

- [33] Ho, Mae-Wan. The Rainbow and the Worm...
Chp 12 Crystal Consciousness. Pg193-194

- [34] Ho, Mae-Wan. Quantum Phases and Quantum Coherence
See free article online at: <http://www.i-sis.org.uk/QPAQC.php>

- [35] Bey, Hakim. Radio Sermonettes. http://www.hermetic.com/bey/radio_se.html

*vii. Nevertheless, we are repelled by the extreme alienation of the arts, especially in the media, in commercial publishing & galleries, in the recording industry, etc. And we sometimes worry even about the extent to which our very involvement in such arts as writing, painting, or music implicates us in **a nasty abstraction, a removal from immediate experience. We miss the directness of play (our original kick in doing art in the first place); we miss smell, taste, touch, the feel of bodies in motion.***

*viii. Computers, video, radio, printing presses, synthesizers, fax machines, tape recorders, photocopiers--these things make good toys, but terrible addictions. Finally we realize we cannot `` reach out and touch someone who is not present in the flesh. **These media may be useful to our art--but they must not possess us, nor must they stand between, mediate, or separate us from our animal/animate selves. We want to control our media, not be Controlled by them.** And we should like to remember a certain psychic martial art which stresses the realization that **the body itself is the least mediated of all media.***

*ix. Therefore, as artists & cultural workers who have no intention of giving up activity in our chosen media, we nevertheless demand of ourselves **an extreme awareness of immediacy** , as well as the mastery of **some direct means of implementing this awareness as play**, immediately (at once) & immediately (without mediation).*

x. Fully realizing that any art manifesto written today can only stink of the same bitter irony it seeks to oppose, we nevertheless declare without hesitation (without too much thought) **the founding of a movement, IMMEDIATISM.** We feel free to do so because we intend to practice *Immediatism* in secret, in order to avoid any contamination of mediation.

[36] Ho, Mae-Wan. The Rainbow and the worm. Chp 15 Time and Freewill. Pg242

[37] Ho, Mae-Wan. The Rainbow and the Worm. pg.6 Chp1. What is it to be alive?

[38] Ho, Mae-Wan. The Rainbow and the Worm. pg.246 Chp15.

[39] Bailey, D. Chp 38. 'Free Improvisation'.

Pg 257. Audio Culture. Ed. Cox, C & Warner, D.

And as regards method, the improviser employs the oldest in music-making. [...] Historically, it pre-dates any other music - mankind's first musical performance couldn't have been anything other than a free improvisation - and I think that it is a reasonable speculation that at most times since then there will have been some kind of music-making most aptly described as free improvisation

[40] Cage, John. Chpt 27. 'Composition as process: indeterminacy' .pg 184

Published in Audio Culture. Ed. Christopher Cox and Daniel Warner. Continuum 2004.

This is a lecture on composition which is indeterminate with respect to its performance. That composition is necessarily experimental. An experimental action is one the outcome of which is not foreseen. Being unforeseen, this action is not concerned with its excuse. Like the land, like the air, it needs none. A performance of a composition which is indeterminate of its performance is necessarily unique. It cannot be repeated. When performed a second time, the outcome is other than it was. Nothing therefore is accomplished by such a performance, since that performance cannot be grasped as an object in time. A recording of such a work has no more value than a postcard; it provides a knowledge of something that happened, whereas the action was a non-knowledge of something that had not yet happened.